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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis explores the processes of socio-economic and political change 
leading up to the most recent upheavals in the Arab World, with a focus on Tunisia 
and Morocco. A comparative study of the different historical trajectories of these 
countries is useful to identify causes for variation between countries that share many 
cultural, historical, socio-economic, and also political characteristics. The thesis 
illustrates how these countries have liberalized their economies without liberalizing 
their polities to the same extent, a process that has undermined regime legitimacy 
gradually over many years.  
 In Tunisia the worsening marginalization for growing segments of the 
population led to massive unrest. When exploring how such mobilization was 
possible under repressive conditions, I suggest that a combination of “traditional” 
mobilization by means of NGOs, and “new” mobilization via social media produced 
powerful tools for channeling popular discontent, articulated as oppositional 
discourse.  
 The visible political opportunities for protests in Tunisia were not many, but 
the new, shared discourses of alienation and indignation compelled people to act. In 
Morocco, contention has been a more moderate and drawn-out affair throughout the 
spring and summer of 2011. The thesis contrasts mobilization in these two countries, 
and suggests that differences in regime type, levels of socio-economic development 
and class configuration, as well as patterns of interaction between regimes and 
protesters, may explain most of the variation in how mobilization unfolded, and 
which concessions the state has yielded.
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I - Introduction  
 The winter and spring months of 2010 and 2011 proved momentous in 
contemporary Middle Eastern history. Beginning in Tunisia in December 2010, mass 
protests spread like wildfire, and took the autocratic regimes of Tunisia and Egypt 
completely by surprise. The wave of contention has touched almost all Arab 
countries in what has been termed “The Arab Spring”. With presidents toppled in 
Tunis, Cairo, and Tripoli, and the leaders of Syria and Yemen under unprecedented 
pressure, the events have also challenged many previous postulates about the 
resilience of authoritarian regimes in Arab states. 
 Maybe this perspective of stagnation has been so common because studies of 
Arab countries have had a bias towards analyzing the elite level, when incremental 
change has in fact occurred at the popular level (Korany 2010, 7-8). Processes of 
socio-economic change, a reconfiguration of state-society relations, and the advent of 
globalization and new communications technologies have all affected the Middle 
East. The events of spring 2011 clearly prove that the social, economic, and political 
pressures of the last years have become a burden too heavy to bear for a growing 
number of people; and that the authoritarian regimes in the region had been 
incapable of addressing the grievances of those people. These gradual processes of 
change deserve further study.  
 The puzzle, however, remains that authoritarian regimes typically keep all 
challenges in check - by means of repression, co-optation, and pre-emption. Arab 
regimes have resorted to a discourse of political liberalization over the last two 
decades, often in response to external pressure. However, numerous investigations 
have demonstrated that this “liberalization” has existed only on paper, or that 
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authoritarian leaders have mastered a subtle game where any contestation has taken 
place either among factions inside a corporatist structure, or within a tightly 
monitored sphere of parties and civil society. Therefore, I must examine how 
widespread mobilization and opposition could upset this order so suddenly, and how 
popular movements managed to gain the momentum they did.  
 This thesis seeks to understand why this mobilization occurred, and how it 
could gain the momentum it did in the authoritarian contexts of Tunisia and 
Morocco. The comparison of socio-economic and socio-political contexts in these 
two countries will inform our study of how different protest movements did emerge, 
and why their impacts have been different. 
 Using a comparative study should help identifying and discussing relevant 
factors, notably by contrasting different outcomes in terms of protests and showing 
which variables have conditioned the scale and significance of these protests. 
 There are many perspectives in political science, economics, or political 
sociology that could be used to frame this discussion. The Gramsci School would 
surely focus on the undermining of hegemonic regimes and the transformation of 
means and relations of production in the region. Beatrice Hibou (2006; 2011) has a 
totally different point of departure, and uses the micro-sociological vocabulary of 
Michel Foucault to portray how authoritarian power in Tunisia was infused within 
the most mundane bureaucratic and economic processes. One could also draw upon 
the “Structures of Contestation”- model of Ellen Lust-Okar (2005). For lack of space, 
these approaches will not be included here; instead I opt for a framework of Social 
Movement Theories, and of studying how authoritarian corporatism has prevented an 
autonomous civil society from emerging in the region (see for instance Schmitter 
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1974).  
 The thesis focuses on the cases of Tunisia and Morocco in the sub-region of 
Francophone North Africa. These countries have adopted many of the same 
economic policies over the years, but their political regimes have evolved differently. 
Their socio-economic development levels are also different. All in all, however, I 
argue that one can compare relevant dimensions across the two cases.  
 Social Movement Theories (SMT) contains a range of tools for understanding 
mobilization processes under various political regimes. Nevertheless, most social 
movement models have been derived from a “Western” context, and presuppose the 
existence of a civil society that can act as driving force for mass contentious politics. 
Part two of this thesis therefore conducts a qualitative, empirical study of how 
mobilization could take place under the authoritarian conditions of Tunisia and 
Morocco. I conducted interviews with activists in the two countries to explore these 
phenomena, which have been widely covered in the global media, but which have 
not been the objects of much academic study as of yet.  
 Subsequently, I argue that mobilization in these countries represents a 
fascinating combination of traditional mobilization processes and the application of 
“new” communication resources that enabled the emergence of new popular 
discourse. In order to understand how discontent grows under authoritarian 
conditions when associative life is co-opted, I borrowed insights from social 
constructivist Social Movement Theories. Critics describe SMT as lacking in 
parsimony and clarity, and being so eclectic and contingent that it explains virtually 
“everything and nothing”. On the other hand, qualitative research should allow for 
variables and research design to be embedded in a specific social and political 
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context. I find social constructivist Social Movement Theory to be a broad 
perspective and meta-theory pointing more at where the researcher should focus than 
exactly which variables he or she must include.  
 When applied together with elements of a Political-Opportunity-Structure 
(POS) model of social movements, and a model of authoritarian corporatist regimes, 
I argue that the social constructivist framework proves useful for the purpose of this 
study. Of course, the analysis of new and unfolding phenomena in the Middle East 
might enable us to test and critique pre-established conceptual models, and possibly 
suggest modifications to such models. On a broader scale, theorists might argue 
whether Social Movement Theories derived from a “Western context” have universal 
applicability and can be transposed to the Middle Eastern context at all. All these 
questions should improve further studies of contentious politics in the Middle East. 
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I.  Delimitation and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
 This study will highlight the most recent, and still ongoing, contention in 
Tunisia and Morocco. Furthermore, it will focus on the mostly secular, youth-led 
mobilization for political liberalization and improved economic opportunities that 
has taken place. It will only mention other forms of contention, such as Islamist 
protests, when these are relevant to the main objectives. The research puzzle 
concerning mobilization under an authoritarian state compels us to ask two 
questions, which are interlinked.  
 
• First, why did contentious politics materialize in the recent socio-economic 
and socio-political contexts in both cases observed?  
• Second, how did mobilization attain various degrees of intensity and impact 
in Tunisia and in Morocco? 
 The claims made by protesters obviously reflect their sense of grievance and 
injustice about current socio-economic and political conditions. The first objective 
must therefore be to map out major developments that have undermined the status 
quo (or the ancien régime in the case of Tunisia). The first empirical section of the 
study traces and compares the socio-economic troubles of Tunisia and Morocco all 
the way back to deficient policies in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 Secondly, this thesis will investigate how these grievances were translated 
into action. In order to address this puzzle, theories on contentious politics will be 
applied, looking at political opportunities and constraints/threats, the generation of 
collective action frames, and the relationship between regimes and protest 
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movements. These concepts will also help clarifying why protests in Tunisia and 
Morocco evolved along quite different paths.  
  
 
I.2 Methods of the study1
 This study will employ mostly qualitative research methods, and will be 
based on primary sources in the form of interviews, and secondary sources such as 
scholarly articles, books, web logs (blogs), and analytic and journalistic material 
retrieved online. 
 
 
I.2.1 A Comparative Approach 
 
 A comparative study begs that I define accurately the concepts that are being 
studied and compared. Our two Maghreb cases share numerous cultural, historical, 
societal and religious characteristics. I argue in this thesis that their regimes and civil 
societies also share relevant features, despite the apparent differences between a 
                                                 
1 Research Ethics and Informed Consent 
 The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the American University in Cairo had 
approved the ethical aspects of the research on May 29, 2011, prior to any field research 
(Please refer to Annex II). There is always an element of uncertainty pertaining to informed 
consent (Beauchamp, et al. 1982). Respondents might not have knowledge of social science 
research methods or terminology, and they have no means of knowing how the data might be 
disseminated at a later stage. However, the subjects of this research can be considered 
autonomous – they are generally outspoken, educated, resourceful individuals, and I 
assumed that they were capable of assessing the consequences of their own participation. 
 In any case, since I was interacting with human subjects in a volatile political 
environment, I followed a number of guidelines to reduce the risk for my interviewees. 
Notably, I decided not to use a recording device. Not recording the responses on tape 
unavoidably affects the reliability of data (Silverman 2010, 240). To strengthen the quality of 
the final analysis, however, I have quoted direct extracts from the responses given, and kept 
the discussion closely tied to the set of responses obtained. This should help in understanding 
how I investigated the topic and analyzed the data (Ibid, 300). 
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traditional monarchy like Morocco and Tunisia’s republican regime. Moreover, the 
two countries can be compared to the rest of North Africa or the Middle East, and the 
surge in protests across the region during the spring of 2011 points to the fact that 
many countries in the region have similar social, economic and political problems.  
 Tunisia and Morocco are comparable because they do not have significant oil 
rent, unlike many Arab countries. Their political economies have therefore developed 
differently from neighboring Algeria, for instance. The lack of rentier states would 
seem to indicate that the Tunisian and Moroccan regimes are less immune to 
repeated societal pressures and economic crises. In comparison with other Middle 
Eastern regimes, Tunisia and Morocco have remained remarkably stable until 
recently, and their regimes have maintained a pro-Western orientation since 
independence (Pfeifer 1999).  
 I opt for a flexible comparative design inspired by the Most Similar Systems 
research design (MSSD) (Landman 2003). Due to a lack of space I will not elaborate 
further on background and control variables such as cultural, linguistic, historical and 
other features which Tunisia and Morocco share. The research design used here 
focuses on finding one or more independent variables which vary across the cases 
and may explain a given dependent variable, given that other dimensions are 
approximately similar. Although a complex dimension in itself, the outcome I want 
to focus on here is the degree of contention. A more specific conceptualization of 
this dimension will be given later. 
The research design should allow for a study of how contentious politics in 
one country inspired protests in another, while differences in state-society relations 
and the articulation of grievances conditioned the outcomes of protests. I will single 
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out both general dimensions and more specific factors that appear to explain some of 
the variance between our cases, but I will not claim that these determine any 
outcomes, or that they are the sole relevant variables to the comparison. The 
numerous processes studied here are highly nuanced, and a thesis cannot do them all 
justice. Besides the differences, we shall also explore the similarities between the 
countries, which pertain particularly to our question of why protests have erupted. 
 When undertaking qualitative analysis based on survey data and socio-
economic database materials, it is important to keep in mind the possible 
shortcomings of such data sets, especially when they concern developing countries 
(Richards and Waterbury 2008, 10, 134, 274). Collection of accurate data in such 
settings is often very difficult, and available data might have been distorted for 
political purposes. 
 
 
I.2.2 Interviews: A tool for exploratory research 
 
 For the second main empirical chapter of this thesis, I chose to conduct semi-
structured interviews with activists, bloggers and protest organizers in main cities in 
Tunisia and Morocco (Tunis, Sousse, Rabat, and Marrakesh). The interview guide 
(please refer to Annex III) contained the main questions and themes that I wanted to 
touch upon, but the interviews did not have to adhere strictly to this guide; as the 
interviews proceeded, I sometimes wanted to follow up on interesting points with 
additional questions, and the interviewees were quite free to elaborate on themes 
they found important. As a minimum, however, I sought to ensure that all topics were 
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covered at each interview – this to permit that a proper comparison could be made 
and common trends in the material analyzed.  
 Time and resource constraints, limitations on the availability of information 
about individual activists and their role, and geographical distance, set restrictions on 
the ways I could find suitable persons to interview. I cannot claim that the activists I 
talked to were representative of the larger population of activists in each country, and 
even less that they are representative of the crowds of protesters who joined them in 
Tunis, Casablanca, Rabat, and elsewhere.  
 A small sample size (20) and the unknown degree of representability in turn 
affected the reliability of the results obtained. One may also discuss critically the 
validity of any inference derived from in-depth interviews. One should always reflect 
on whether interviewees will use a different discourse and emphasize different things 
when they talk to researchers than when they interact with their own social 
environment. The interview setting is a specific social setting which affects the 
content and form of communication between interviewer and interviewee, and the 
data retrieved are in essence subjective narratives conveyed by the interviewee. 
Finally, the wording of questions will inevitably affect the responses obtained, both 
in terms of the content and the discourse used to convey the content (Silverman 
2010, 128, 225; Roulston, de Marrais, and Lewis 2003, 654)2
  
. 
                                                 
2  Silverman also brings up the problems associated with carrying out retrospective 
studies.   
 For this particular study, events in Morocco have unfolded until the present day, 
while the mobilization phase I focus on in Tunisia took place about  a year ago  – which 
might affect the answers people give, because people generally view the past “through the 
lens of the present” (Silverman 2010, 192). However, the popular contention in Tunisia took 
a long time to subside, and the mass protests in January 2011 are still in a past so recent that 
I find it justifiable to ask for recollections of these events from interviewees.  
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II - Conceptual Framework and Theory Review 
 
II.1 State-society relations and the authoritarian corporatist 
 order 
  
 In order to study the recent surge in contentious politics in the Middle East, it 
is necessary to define key concepts and develop a theoretical framework. The 
fundamental argument that contentious politics “emerge from groups in society 
which advance claims against the state” (Goldstone 2001, 142) begs a further study 
of how regimes in Tunisia and Morocco related to their respective societies, and 
more specifically, to organized civil society: to labor unions, professional 
associations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), among others. Both 
regimes used co-optation, manipulation, repression and subjugation alternatively and 
in varying doses to control major organized groups in society. These mechanisms 
have worked in slightly different ways in monarchic Morocco and republican 
Tunisia, but I argue in line with Eshteshami and Murphy (1996, 757) that the two 
political orders have been comparable nonetheless. 
 Both represent varieties of a Middle Eastern authoritarian corporatist state, 
and scholars argue further that these are examples of states ruled by means of an 
“authoritarian bargain”. This means that civil society has mostly remained 
acquiescent and loyal to the regime, which has provided a degree of social justice, 
economic security, and development in return. The concept of an “authoritarian 
contract” or “ruling bargain” in Middle Eastern states has been shared widely among 
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analysts (Al Sayyid 1995, 139; Brumberg 1995, 233; Paczynska 2010, 36). This 
notion has also been contested, but I adopt it here with the knowledge that it requires 
substantial contextualization and nuance to be useful. In the Middle East, Kamrava 
(2007, 202) argues that the authoritarian bargain has been characterized by intra-elite 
conflicts, leading to the prevailing elite creating a direct link to the masses. Such 
populist authoritarianism (Brumberg 1995, 233) built on a pervasive ideology, which 
claimed that society constituted an “organic whole”, where the various components 
are obliged to function together in harmony. As we shall see, the Moroccan 
government has never espoused this ideology formally, but it has used corporatist 
mechanisms and a substantial public sector to develop the country and retain its grip 
on power (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 198-201). Middle Eastern regimes have 
typically developed special relationships with certain constituencies within the state, 
for instance organized labor, civil servants or state-owned enterprises, and offered 
them considerable side-payments for their loyalty (Kamrava 2007, 202). 
 The objective of corporatism has been to tone down class politics and other 
horizontal loyalties, which rulers have perceived as disruptive. It is clear that many 
Middle Eastern governments have preferred to institutionalize vertical bonds 
between the state and sectors of social and economic life, in order to control 
potentially rival loci of power (see Schmitter 1974, 93-94, 106). In republics such as 
Tunisia, the one-party state embodied the corporatist model. Leaders and cadres of 
the single party controlled the state, and used internal channels to mediate with 
different interest groups (Anderson 1986, 232-250). Society was organized along 
economic sectors, and the segmentation of workers into different, and often rivaling, 
unions, which were kept under tight political control, prevented potential class 
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mobilization. Challenges to this order were denounced as undermining national 
cohesion, and were swiftly suppressed (Eshteshami & Murphy 1996, 755).  
 As the vertical ties between the state and certain constituencies deepened, the 
two became increasingly dependent on each other, which further kept challenges to 
the state's dominance in check. The establishment of such ties often happened in 
informal ways: The extension of a patrimonial system emanating from the executive 
has been a typical feature of Middle Eastern regimes. Clientelistic networks were 
often twinned with more overt political control of associations, such as in Tunisia, or 
they thrived as informal bonds between the regime and organizations that were 
seemingly autonomous, such as in Morocco.  
 In the case of Moroccan politics, analysts have underlined the importance of 
the Makhzen as the “backbone” of the state. The concept of Makhzen has become 
synonymous with central power in contemporary Morocco. This network is clearly 
clientelistic, and links the monarchy to various individuals, associations and 
institutions, while “controlling power networks, patrimonial exchanges, and 
distribution of wealth” (Layachi 1998, 31). The Makhzen also includes much of 
associative life, and Brumberg (1995) concludes that authoritarian corporatism, 
clientelist largesse, and a weak and subordinate civil society are all complementary 
and reinforcing phenomena. 
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II.1.1 Civil society under authoritarian corporatism 
 
 There has been a lively debate concerning whether the term “civil society”, in 
its liberal, Lockean sense, can be applied in the Middle Eastern context at all. Locke 
and de Tocqueville represent the tradition where autonomous organized interests are 
viewed as posing a necessary and useful counterweight to the state (Layachi 1998, 
13-14). From a liberal view, civil society is commonly viewed as the “organization of 
society at the level between the family and the state” (Brynen, Korany and Noble 
1995, 11). 
 Moreover, observers who approach Middle Eastern societies from a liberal 
perspective will typically include an aspect of “civility” in their definition of civil 
society: Organizations only form part of this vision of “civil society” if they adhere 
to principles of pluralism, moderation, and tolerance of different views. Hence, many 
analysts have tended to exclude Islamist associations in the Middle East from their 
notion of civil society, because they have perceived the latter as authoritarian and 
intolerant (Zubaida 1992, 3). This exclusionary categorization can be problematic, 
because Islamist organizations have typically been much more successful than other 
movements in the Middle East (Sater 2007). The liberal view is of course that a 
modern, vibrant and pluralistic civil society is a necessary vehicle to advance 
political liberalization and democratization in authoritarian states.  
 There have been diverging views on the actual influence of liberal civil 
society organizations in the Middle East. Especially organizations working on human 
rights, political liberalization, and democratization issues, have more often than not 
been described as weak, fragmented, and numerically few, although their conditions 
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have improved over the years. They have also been characterized as “disconnected” 
from large segments of the population in the respective countries. Due to the difficult 
conditions for advocacy organizations under repressive conditions, it is also typical 
that some of the most successful organizations in the region have been de-politicized 
charities (Kandil 2010, 48-49).  
 Different explanations have been suggested for why Arab civil society is 
weak. From our discussion of authoritarian corporatism above, it is clear that the 
state has sought to tie all economic and social sectors of the country to itself in a 
hierarchical fashion, which has weakened the autonomy of the associative sphere. 
Especially organizations representing organized labor, students, lawyers and other 
key political forces have been co-opted, and regimes tried for decades to negotiate 
special relationships with resourceful constituencies of the middle classes, 
constituencies which could otherwise challenge the current order and lead regime 
change. Additionally, of course, regimes such as the Tunisian and Moroccan ones 
have always been able to wield a variety of economic, legal, and police tools against 
any elements of civil society viewed as challenging the status quo.  
 There are Orientalist scholars who have argued that authoritarian corporatism 
and its accompanying docile civil society constitute the “natural” socio-political 
order in Middle Eastern societies, because it conforms to the essence of the region’s 
Islamic culture. However, these arguments carry an essentialist bias, and disregard 
historical path-dependent developments such as colonialism, the weakness of the 
indigenous capitalist middle class, and super power meddling in domestic affairs 
during the Cold War, which were not conducive to the founding of liberal 
democracies on the “Western” model (Zubaida 1993, 123). 
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II.1.3 Economic order and economic reform under authoritarianism 
  
 The recent protests in Tunisia and Morocco reflect the economic grievances 
of an increasing number of people, grievances that are echoed by calls for political 
reform. Arab states have been compelled to liberalize their economies over the last 
three decades, and this in turn has made them less able to deliver on their end of the 
authoritarian bargain (Paczynska 2010, 37). 
 The authoritarian corporatist order is fundamentally economic as well as 
political, and the ambitious development plans and socioeconomic visions that were 
adopted by most Middle Eastern states after World War II led to a heavy statist 
involvement in their respective economies. Middle Eastern regimes typically 
mobilized around an ideology of economic redistribution and social justice, and they 
therefore also dismissed the private sector as a reliable partner in the development 
venture. In any case, indigenous entrepreneurial classes were usually small and 
relatively weak in financial terms, and perceived as too closely tied to foreign 
commercial interests as well as too reminiscent of colonial times, to play any great 
role in the newly independent states (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 181). 
 Along with the state’s predominant role in the economy came its authoritarian 
political program of corporatist bargains and the rally around the national interest, 
with political liberalization put on hold indefinitely. This statist involvement was 
almost as extensive in the traditional Middle Eastern monarchies as in the fledgling 
republics (Ibid, 202). State-led development was generally flawed, however: Import-
substitution industrialization (ISI), centralized price and import controls, and the 
exponential expansion of the public sector engendered major structural deficiencies 
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(Brumberg 1995, 234). Countries across the region were often financing expensive 
welfare and education programs, while subsidizing the prices of some staple foods 
and key commodities. Import substitution industrialization, for its part, turned into a 
daunting logistical and technological challenge that required considerable imports. 
  
 State interventionism in the economy proved inefficient and conducive to 
worsening corruption and clientelism. Public sector officials engaged in rent-seeking 
rather than achieving greater productivity3
 As Richards and Waterbury (Ibid. 221) point out, this process was inevitably 
painful. The standards of living for people on fixed incomes declined, unemployment 
. Due to the fact that authoritarian systems 
legitimized their rule with a populist program of employment and development, and 
in reality used massive clientelism to buy political acquiescence, regimes across the 
Middle East were loath to enforce major changes in this system (Farsoun and 
Zacharia 1995, 262). Ultimately, though, countries across the board ran into balance-
of-payments crises, and had to request loans from the international monetary 
institutions. With these loans came demands for economic austerity and structural 
adjustment of their economies (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 220). Structural 
adjustment normally entailed the following points: Fiscal discipline, tax reform, 
liberalization of interest rates, the streamlining of exchange rates, trade liberalization, 
encouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI), privatization, deregulation and 
securing property rights (Williamson 1990, cited in Richards and Waterbury 2008, 
229). 
                                                 
3 Richards and Waterbury (2008, 17) define rent-seeking behavior as the search for strategic 
privileges in domestic markets, privileges that the public authorities often control. Evans (1995, 34 
cited in Kamrava 2007) enumerates rentier mechanisms such as controlling remittance flows, 
rationing foreign exchange, restricting import licenses and tariffs etc. These were frequently used 
in the Maghreb. 
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soared – even among the highly educated, and groups that had enjoyed corporatist 
privileges under the old system found themselves under aggravating economic and 
social pressures (Farsoun and Zacharia 1995, 263). This pertained increasingly to the 
middle class groups – civil servants, employees of state-owned corporations and so 
on – which were so crucial to the authoritarian bargain from the outset. 
Unemployment soared among recent graduates who had expected to be incorporated 
into the existing structures. This led to repeated crises and social unrest in all 
countries concerned, to which regimes increasingly answered with repression.   
 Leaders adopted a discourse of economic and political transformation in 
response, but the restructuring did not lead to genuine democratization in any Arab 
country. Elections were held in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Jordan, and censorship 
of the press and restrictions on forming associations were relaxed in several 
countries. Observers tended to believe that Arab countries would join the “Third 
Wave of Democratization” that was simultaneously taking place in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and elsewhere (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, 373-374). 
However, reforms were quickly abandoned and authoritarian practices 
reasserted in all these countries, except maybe Morocco. Part of explaining the 
different outcomes on our dependent variable must be exactly to contrast these 
regime mechanisms between Tunisia and Morocco. More generally, Eshteshami and 
Murphy (1996, 763) argue that the brief democratic interlude was only intended to 
defuse political tensions while painful economic reforms were carried out. As 
Luciani stated, “countries revert to democratic rule in times of economic crisis, 
including IMF-imposed structural adjustment packages” (1988, 463). Ultimately, the 
new, liberalized economic order has not been mirrored by enduring political 
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liberalization. 
 As a result, regime legitimacy has declined over time, as the successes of 
Islamist groups, and the surge in riots observed across the Middle East, testify to. 
The failed political liberalization in Algeria from 1988 to 1992, and riots in 
Moroccan cities, such as in Fes in 1990, has also been the focus of French 
scholarship on the Maghreb. LeSaout and Rollinde (1999) discuss the prevalence of 
riots in their Émeutes et Mouvements sociaux au Maghreb. They see riots as 
symptoms of a growing opposition and as “safety valves” for people to let off anger 
against increasingly exclusionary forms of authoritarianism and economic liberalism. 
Conceptually, they view riots as a “language” of contention in closed political 
systems where no other meaningful channel for expressing grievances exists.  
 The French authors also emphasize the limited scope of riots: The reach and 
duration of the latter are limited, and rioters most often mobilize around basic 
economic grievances such as the price of bread. Hence, the Maghreb regimes have 
grown accustomed to these disturbances, and have developed the repressive 
capacities to quell them (Gallisot 1989). Le Saout and Rollinde (1999, 28) concur 
with Gallisot (1989) that the nationalist development project in the Maghreb has 
broken down. The regional states have turned into predatory apparatuses at the 
disposal of the new bourgeoisie of business, bureaucrat, and police/army elites, 
which they label l’État-policier and l’État-business. The question then becomes how 
the 2010-2011 protests could move from riots to “revolution”, for which the North 
African governments were not prepared. 
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II.2 Theory Review on Contentious Politics 
  
 To understand how widespread and sustained mobilization actually 
materialized in Morocco and Tunisia, I need to add an extra dimension to our 
conceptual framework. The socio-economic decline I sketched above resulted in 
economic and political grievances, but this does not tell us how it was possible to 
bring people out to contest these conditions. Sidney Tarrow (1998, 142), a theorist of 
social movements, defines a cycle of contention as follows: “a phase of heightened 
conflict across the social system; (…) the creation of new or transformed collective 
action frames, a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and 
sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and 
authorities”. It is clear that the sudden rise of protest movements in the Arab world 
since December 2010 represents such a cycle. Social movement studies, an 
interdisciplinary sub-field of the social sciences, suggest tools to approach and 
dissect these complex processes. This diverse sub-field draws upon political science, 
political psychology, and sociology, among others. 
 Marxist works have undoubtedly influenced strands of social movement 
studies, but the main approaches that I apply in this thesis all have a liberal 
inclination. In fact, the studies of collective behavior that predated social movement 
studies placed much emphasis on individual rationality and self-interest. Mancur 
Olson (1965) posited that the classic “free-rider” problem made it an apparent 
paradox that rational individuals would organize into social movements in the first 
place, and he ended up suggesting a new framework for understanding how such 
organization could occur (DeFay 1999, 19). Inspired by Olson, theorists forged what 
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became known as the resource mobilization approach. The theory kept the 
assumptions and precepts of methodological individualism, but scholars tended to 
use decisions made at the organizational level as starting point for analysis (Tarrow 
1998, 16; DeFay 1999, 20).  
 The resource mobilization model was soon criticized for making problematic 
assumptions about rational individuals and the dynamics of organizations, and for 
ignoring the importance of ideology and collective identity for mobilizing people. 
New approaches such as social constructivism, post-positivism, and the general 
“cultural and linguistic turn” in the social sciences inspired a new generation of 
academics. Charles Tilly, although not a social constructivist himself, was one of the 
prominent social movement theorists who singled out the unsolved conceptual 
challenge of determining whether external causal mechanisms, or rather purposive 
agency, drove contention forward (1978, 6). 
 Social constructivism focused especially on the importance of framing: 
Frames are interpretative schemes that people use to make sense of events and to 
guide collective action (Snow 1986). McAdam (1982, 51) stated: “before collective 
action can get underway, people must collectively define their situations as unjust”. 
When people are going through such a collective process, one observes the 
generation of a mobilization potential (Kriesi et al. 1995, 5). social constructivists 
have further suggested that social movements strive to achieve frame alignment – 
which means that they make use of collective frames that resonate with the 
individual frames of people they try to mobilize (Snow 1986)4
                                                 
4 Curtis and Zurcher (1973, 53) also present the notion of multi-organizational fields, which are 
defined as the totality of organizations with which the social movement might establish linkages. 
The configuration of multi-organizational fields might affect the strength and coherence of a social 
movement – not all alliances of relevant organizations are necessarily supportive of the movement 
. 
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 Frame production and alignment are clearly discursive and intersubjective 
processes. Intersubjectivity refers to shared meanings constructed by people in 
interaction with each other, and the process by which these shared meanings are 
continuously contested and renegotiated within a group. Formulating the concept of 
intersubjectivity was arguably an attempt to move beyond the methodological 
individualism of Olson and others (Melucci 1995, 45).  
 Dutch researcher Bert Klandermans suggested that these shared beliefs form 
the basis for a two-step mobilization process (1984, 586). Consensus mobilization is 
the process whereby a movement or a cluster of organizations attempts to gain as 
much support as possible for the collective good they seek to promote. Action 
mobilization is Klandermans’s term for the act of calling people up to protest, and it 
presupposes that consensus mobilization has taken place beforehand.  
 The Political-Opportunity-Structure (POS) approach is a different model, 
owing in part to the path-breaking work of Charles Tilly (1978), and later Doug 
McAdam (1981). Tarrow (1998, 19-20) specifies that the POS model focuses on 
changes in political opportunity structures external to the social movement itself, but 
accepts that it is complementary to the social constructivist paradigm, which he also 
treats at length. Tarrow purports that “people engage in contentious politics when 
patterns of political opportunities and constraints change”. Political opportunities are 
defined as a perceived set of clues for when contentious politics will emerge: 
“consistent (…) dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage 
in contentious politics.” The constraints are defined as “factors – like repression, but 
                                                                                                                                          
(cited in Klandermans 1997, 142).  
 (4 continued): In our cases, the concept of multi-organizational fields can be brought in to 
analyze the cohesiveness and effectiveness of civil society pertaining to the protests. 
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also like the capacity of authorities to present a solid front to insurgents – that 
discourage contention” (Ibid, 20). Briefly, Tarrow enumerates the general 
opportunity changes he finds most important: 1) Increased political access, mostly by 
means of elections – 2) deepening divisions among elites, – 3) political realignments 
strengthening the protest movement– 4) influential elite groups defect to protesters’ 
camp – and 5) repression is moderate or inconsistent (Ibid, 77-80). However, he 
admonishes that these are contingent dimensions, and that other dimensions may be 
more relevant in other empirical cases than his own. Opportunity changes may occur 
either before or simultaneously with the protest cycle, but Tarrow’s model also brings 
in more stable aspects of opportunity-constraints: State strength and repression (Ibid. 
81). 
 Our empirical study will endeavor to ascertain whether Tarrow’s political 
opportunities for contention actually did open in Tunisia and Morocco before 
protests erupted, or whether other political opportunities or constraints must be 
identified. Alternatively, contention flared up under a stable authoritarian system. In 
the case of Tunisia, the latter narrative has been presented in most media and early 
analyses of the events. Kuran (1991) illustrates that when collective action does 
break out under depressed conditions of organization, “(...) it turns from a trickle into 
a torrent as people learn for the first time that others like themselves have taken to 
the streets.” This is reminiscent of the cycle of contention in Tunisia, as we shall see. 
A preliminary reading on Morocco, on the other hand, seems to indicate that political 
opportunities had indeed opened there throughout the decade of King Mohamed VI’s 
rule, and that the state had become much more tolerant of protests. The question 
remains to what extent the most recent wave of contention represents a qualitatively 
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new phenomenon also in Morocco.  
 
 
II.2.1 Consensus as the groundwork for collective action 
  
  Shared action frames and identities may arguably empower restive, repressed 
societies in relation to their authoritarian masters. For this process to take root, 
however, I need a more specific model of how collective action frames are generated. 
Gamson (1995, 89-90), a prominent theorist of collective action, identifies three key 
factors that must be present for a consensus to become a plausible platform for such 
action: 
• The injustice factor is usually defined as outrage over the way the 
government is treating a social problem, most often originating from a feeling 
of illegitimate inequality or a feeling that key moral principles are being 
violated (see Klandermans 1997, 38). Gamson highlights the emotional side 
of injustice, and its potential as a driving force for participation (1995, 89-
91). Strong media images might often produce compelling emotional 
reactions of this kind. Melucci mentions that mobilization cannot simply be 
reduced to a cost-benefit calculation, because adherents have to be 
emotionally attached to their cause (1995, 45; see also McAdam 1982, 51). 
 
• The shared identity aspect, which Melucci described as indispensable (1995, 
44-47; Klandermans 1997, 41). Shared identity is a ubiquitous phenomenon, 
but is only politically relevant if one is able to define a concrete “us” in 
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opposition to a clearly defined target for protest, “them”, which could be the 
government, for instance. The inverse is also true: If the target of a grievance 
is too abstract or too diffuse, or not known, people will not move (Gamson 
1995, 90). 
 
• The agency dimension - People need to believe that something “can be done” 
about an issue. A dissemination of the belief that collective action can be 
successful is related to a perceived opening of political opportunities 
(Klandermans 1997, 42). Under authoritarian conditions, agency will often be 
hindered by passivity and fear. State media will echo the regime’s discourse 
of quietism, law and order, and portray mobilization as a dramatic breach of 
social stability (Gamson 1995, 96). However, when there are media images of 
successful action readily available, people find it easier to join a cause and 
identify the target (Ibid, 104). Gamson concludes that agency should be 
treated as a “dormant characteristic” in human beings, and as something one 
should try to awaken (Ibid, 106).  
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II.2.2 Media resources for collective action frame generation 
  
 The aforementioned dimensions beg a study of how media resources could be 
used by activists during the uprisings in the Arab world in the spring of 2011. Both 
Klandermans (1997) and Gamson (1995) are quick to highlight the role of the media 
in disseminating certain discourses and generating action frames. The introduction of 
the Internet to the Middle East has been the most momentous step towards a 
fundamental media transformation in the region, which has enabled an 
unprecedented potential for connectivity, notably through new social media 
(Abdullah 2010, 70-75). The region was previously known for its low scores on all 
indices of globalization. Kamrava (2007, 204) posits that Middle Eastern regimes 
have shown little interest in increasing transparency, opening information flows and 
easing restrictions on civil society – prerequisites of globalization which would 
threaten the regimes. However, new communication technologies have slowly 
become available to at least strata from the middle-classes upwards. 
 Cottle (2011, 648) argues that these new media have been fused directly into 
political processes within the recent Arab uprisings. In societies where there are no 
real ways of political claims-making outside the regime, social media create a new, 
highly inclusive, and informal space for exchanging opinions and engaging in 
politics (Dahlgren 2009, cited in Cottle 2011). Online, new identities can be created, 
shared, and transformed, and new interests and demands identified by a large number 
of individuals. Such live communication helps to embolden formerly passive 
individuals, for instance by appealing to the emotional aspect Gamson (1995) noted. 
Aspects of collective identity, and a sense of who the “enemy” is, can clearly be built 
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and sustained online, and images of protests and of successful regime changes in 
other countries nourishes the agency aspect for increasing numbers of individuals 
(Cottle 2011, 654). At the same time, regimes have not hesitated to set strict controls 
on online content (Ibid. 653). Bloggers and activists have been harassed and arrested, 
and their pages shut down, e.g. in Tunisia. Nevertheless, a challenge for regimes has 
been the basic fact that cyberspace is not confined to actual geography: Leading 
online militants are often located abroad, or in unknown locations, as an “offshore” 
democratizing force. 
 The use of media and Internet also draws attention to the transnational impact 
of the ongoing events in the Maghreb: The revolution in Tunisia has undoubtedly had 
direct bearing on the occurrence of unrest in the rest of the Middle East over the last 
months. Tarrow can remind us that as long as the target of contention is the domestic 
regime, contention itself is not transnational – but ideas about contention, and the 
prospect of successful regime change, amount to a transnational diffusion of ideas 
and agency which alter calculations of opportunity and threat in similar settings 
(1998, 185).  
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II.2.4 Synthesis of the Conceptual Framework and hypotheses 
 
 To sum up the theoretical works above, I will suggest dependent and 
independent variables which must be examined and compared and the tentative 
relationship between them presented as a set of hypotheses. Our dependent concept 
is degrees of contention, and under this label I will examine the speed and size of 
demonstrations (action mobilization) and the “radicalism” (revolutionary or 
reformist) of protesters' demands. As indicated earlier, the dependent variable is not 
regime change per se, although it is natural to touch on this in the Tunisian case. The 
state's response to contention constitutes an integral part of the conditions for protest. 
From the general theories and preliminary readings reviewed above, one might 
suggest the following independent variables:  
• Extent and impact of economic liberalization, also within cases across time 
(the last three decades). 
• Extent and impact of political liberalization, also within cases across time (the 
last three decades). 
• Legitimacy of the regime/perception of injustice 
• Strength and cohesiveness of civil society 
• Access to Internet and media resources 
• Literacy and education levels 
• Extent of consensus mobilization 
• Perception of agency 
 
 
34 
 
These variables are all qualitative phenomena, so again one must be 
reminded that they are not necessarily discrete, exhaustive or possible to gauge 
with precision. Especially the importance of perceptions is difficult to assess. The 
purpose of this study is precisely to explore recent events with the ambition of 
detecting new factors and relationships. Thirdly, these factors do not correspond 
or pair up neatly with the dependent variables; rather, they impinge on each other 
and might function as intervening variables etc. in a system which cannot be fully 
defined and extricated here.  
Based on these theoretical tools and preliminary insights I present the 
following general model of contentious politics in Tunisia and Morocco, 
containing four sub-hypotheses:  
 
1. The “authoritarian bargain” is undermined as regimes renew their hold on 
power in different ways, while socio-economic and demographic changes 
affect increasing numbers of Tunisians and Moroccans negatively.  
2. People use communication technologies to disseminate a consensus about 
grievances and injustice. 
3. A triggering event sparks protests, which echo widely because of the widely 
shared sense of grievances – the pre-existing consensus. The intensity of 
grievances affects the intensity of protests. 
4. The transnational diffusion of ideas becomes the “spark” in neighboring 
countries, and the cycle of contention spreads across borders. 
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III – Socio-economic Changes and Authoritarian 
Stagnation 
 
III.1 Economic crises and structural adjustment 
  
 Our two cases, Tunisia and Morocco, both engaged in economic reforms and 
structural adjustment in the 1980s. These countries felt the disadvantages of their 
previous statist economic policies quite early: Tunisia effectively pioneered the 
Infitah reform package (which is better known from Egypt (Richards and Waterbury 
2008, 239)) in the early 1970s, and Morocco followed suit with timid attempts at 
stabilization in 1977 (Ibid, 243). However, changes were restricted to improving the 
already state-dominated economy, with the government still in control of prices, 
credits and foreign exchange. 
 Neither country was able to prevent the misallocation of resources due to 
state control over the economy, and both wanted to avoid reneging on promises about 
salary rises in the public sector and further growth in investments intended to create 
jobs. Being politically paralyzed, both the Moroccan and the Tunisian governments 
believed they could “grow through” the compounded shocks of falling oil and 
phosphate prices, international economic recession in the early 1980s, rising interest 
rates on international loans, drought, and, for Morocco, the costs of the war in 
Western Sahara (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 240, 243; Layachi 1998b, 57). This 
unwarranted optimism enticed both regimes to continue to borrow heavily from 
abroad, resulting in severe balance-of-payments crises. 
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 Morocco, one of the most vulnerable economies in North Africa, had to bow 
to the pressure and accept structural adjustment in 1983. Tunisia followed suit in 
August 1986, after having proudly resisted for a long time (Richards and Waterbury 
2008, 240). The leadership of aging Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba had become 
more and more erratic, and the coup d’état of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on November 
7, 1987 was partly driven by the need for a predictable, pragmatic course in the 
country’s economic policy. Thence, Ben Ali was committed to reforms, as was King 
Hassan II in Morocco. 
  The adjustment packages they signed on to included classical measures such 
as devaluating currencies, promoting exports, reducing tariffs and import protection, 
deregulating the banking sector, raising real interest rates, privatization, and reducing 
budget deficits (Beau and Tuquoi 1999, 147). Typically, the IMF and the World Bank 
wanted governments to have deficits no higher than 4% of GDP (Ibid, 220; Layachi 
1998b 58-60). Subsidies were to be removed or reduced to a minimum (Perkins 
2004, 170). 
 Unlike most other Middle Eastern and North African countries, Morocco and 
Tunisia were seen as very compliant with IMF conditionality. Both followed a 
conservative budgetary policy in the end of the 1980s, with Moroccan budget deficits 
falling to around 2% of GDP in the early 1990s (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 244). 
In both countries, real interest rates were positive and inflation reduced to a 
manageable 2-3%, in line with international recommendations. The World Bank 
praised Morocco for its impressive results in 1992, and Ben Ali’s technocratic 
government has also cooperated closely with the international financial institutions in 
implementing macro-economic orthodoxy (Ibid, 239, 244). From 1987-1992, private 
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investment grew to 51% of the total, and by 1997 foreign investment in Tunisia was 
at $500 million (Alexander 2010, 81). GDP growth also accelerated in both 
countries: For the period 1987-1992 it rose from 2.8% to 4.3% in Tunisia, and it 
stabilized at around 4% in Morocco (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 240). Later, 
Moroccan growth has been sluggish however, hovering around 2-3 percent for most 
of the 1990s and early 2000s (Ibid, 245). 
 Both countries persisted on continuing their reforms throughout the same 
decades. As the macro-economic indicators have come under control, the focus has 
shifted to the more challenging task of dealing with deregulation, rationalizing the 
public sector, increasing revenue, and finalizing institutional reforms. Fiscal 
measures were streamlined to favor investment rather than consumption, and efforts 
were made to ensure that private investors could obtain unfettered profits from their 
projects (Pfeifer 1999, 24).  
 In order to achieve the structural goals, Morocco and Tunisia also wanted to 
adhere to free-trade arrangements (Alexander 2010, 82; Bertelsmann Stiftung Online 
2006). Morocco became associated with the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1987, and Tunisia followed suit in 1990. Especially important were 
the comprehensive free trade agreements Tunisia and Morocco negotiated with the 
European Union, their main trading partner, in 1995 and 1996 respectively. The two 
countries were the first on the Mediterranean’s southern shore to be granted this 
privileged access to European markets and money (Alexander 2010, 84; Pfeifer 
1999, 25). These free trade agreements were only politically acceptable because the 
transitional phases were long; it was envisaged that the removal of Tunisian tariffs 
would take place incrementally over 12 years, with full implementation in 2008 
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(Murphy 1999, 148). Moroccan non-tariff protection measures remained high until 
well into the early 2000s. In 2006 the World Bank conceded that “the degree of 
import protection left Morocco with a not very open economy” (2006a, 99). This 
entailed that leading political and economic actors in Morocco continue to seek rent 
as well. 
 Tunisia has maybe been more successful at economic integration. In 1996, the 
European Union (EU) entered a ten year-agreement with the Ben Ali regime to 
upgrade Tunisian businesses and ameliorate both the quality of products and 
efficiency of production – the so-called mise à niveau-program (Alexander 2010, 
83). This support was coupled with further loans from international and bilateral 
lenders – in 2005, Tunisia had a new debt of $19.2 billion, a large amount for an 
economy of its size (Ibid.). 
 Important challenges remained, and Richards and Waterbury highlight that 
the overall scorecard on reform is mixed for both countries (2008, 24, 245). 
Reducing budget deficits was not done by increasing revenue collection or widening 
tax collection, but by slashing public consumption and subsidies, and capping 
salaries and employment figures in the public sector. Both countries achieved great 
short-term income from privatization, but such revenue must be reinvested to add 
value. In most cases, this did not happen (Denoueux 2001, 75). 
 Privatization stagnated for a long time for political reasons in both countries – 
regimes preferred to preserve existing jobs and add new ones, albeit redundant, to 
stem the tide of unemployment (King 1994, 117). Tunisia started privatizing more 
strategic sectors over the last decade, but as we shall see, this process was not 
transparent. The same was the case in Morocco; when privatization of state 
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enterprises finally took place, allegations ensued that the sales benefited the 
politically well connected (Sater 2010, 103; interview with Younes M’Jahid, 
President of the Moroccan Journalists’ Union 2011). Second, trade unions have 
resisted privatization ferociously, strikes and protests have slowed down productivity, 
and investors have often been reluctant to salvage these companies (Richards and 
Waterbury 2008, 245). 
 Beyond the agreements and macro-economic policies enumerated here, the 
institutional reforms associated with economic liberalization have been limited in 
both countries. Although evaluations by the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU have 
been full of praise, and the macro-indicators point in the desired direction, critics 
such as Hibou (2011) find that populism, clientelism, and statist interventions are 
still abundant. Under new economic conditions the special relationships between the 
state and key constituencies have been renegotiated and relabeled: Crucially, regimes 
are now closely tied to small private business elites in each country, private 
businesses have been sold to regime members, and we shall see that this new 
entanglement has damaged their legitimacy considerably. 
 On the other hand subsidies, cheap access to credit, and other populist 
measures to the middle classes were never cut entirely. Corporatism has been 
dismantled in a piecemeal fashion, especially in Tunisia where Ben Ali's regime was 
always compared to Bourguiba's. Tunisians expected education and services to be 
maintained. However, perceived inequalities grew as a result of the reforms, and 
especially the bulging cohorts of youth felt excluded from economic life. The same 
problem affected Morocco, but there a larger segment of the population had never 
been integrated into the statist economy, and they expected less from the authorities. 
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III.2 Unemployment and the challenge of educational reform 
  
 It is interesting to note that Morocco has been much less successful than 
Tunisia at developing its human capital. While Tunisia performed best in the region, 
with the highest enrollment ratios in secondary and higher education, Morocco’s 
ratios are only one third of Tunisia’s, and the former was ranked as one of the worst 
in the MENA region (Harmak 2008, cited in Boukhars 2011, 34). This is a crucial 
contrast to include in our further discussion of the difference between consensus 
mobilization and protests in Tunisia and Morocco. Illiteracy levels in Morocco are 
high among a population that is still relatively poor and rural, and the education 
system is old-fashioned. The result is an educational system which also produces 
graduates with degrees the economy does not need – there is a disconnect between 
the labor market and the educational system that has tremendous social consequences 
(Boukhars 2011, 31; Richards and Waterbury 2008, 119). 
 The situation in Tunisia was also problematic. Murphy (1999, 157-163) 
claims that education had spiraled into crisis already in the 1990s. Among other 
problems, it had become gradually more important for students and parents to 
nurture good connections with the ruling party Rassemblement Constitutionnel 
Démocratique (RCD) to secure access to stipends, elite schools, and sometimes even 
high grades (Ibid.). In short, regime reforms and privatization had contributed to 
aggravating social disparities within the education system. 
  When Tunisian students graduated, they also found an economy that could 
not absorb them. Even though Tunisia has marketed itself as a host country for 
advanced industries, most of the economic expansion has taken place in traditional 
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sectors and tourism, and there has been little demand for graduates – only 7.4% of 
those hired by manufacturing actually have higher education (Haddar 2010, 66). 
 Similar structural problems are apparent in Morocco, where as many as 45% 
of new graduates are unemployed (Boukhars 2011). In certain urban areas such as 
Casablanca the numbers may reach 70%, (in 2002, USAID estimated that total 
unemployment was 20%, and urban unemployment 36%, and levels increase with 
levels of education, and among women (cited in Boukhars 2011). 
 Even before the uprisings of the Arab spring, authors labeled the 
unemployment problem a major potential source of political instability. And the 
ripples on the surface were already showing; in Morocco, organized unemployed 
graduates stormed the headquarters of the Istiqlal party in Casablanca in 2007 
because they were required to take another competitive exam to get jobs. In Rabat, 
daily sit-ins demanding the “Right to Work” have been held for years. The 
government has dealt with the problem in its own piece-meal, patronizing manner: 
1000 graduates were given jobs in 2007, on the condition that they refrained from 
militancy in the streets (Badimon-Emperador 2007: 5). Similarly, the King and his 
technocrats have taken responsibility for highly publicized job-generating 
development projects, reinstating a new form of royal populism in the process 
(Boukhars 2011, 36). One must consider that the Monarchy has been able to follow 
this strategy because unemployed graduates, though an articulate group in Morocco, 
are relatively fewer than in more developed Tunisia. The variations in the numbers of 
graduates correspond with the disparities in education levels and the size of the 
middle classes, where Tunisia has a larger middle educated class than Morocco. All 
these factors in turn impinge levels of mobilization, as we shall see. 
42 
 
III.3 The rhetoric of reform and the reality of authoritarian 
 renewal 
  
 Both Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hassan II in Morocco adopted a language of 
political reform while steering the course of economic adjustment. Ben Ali had to 
legitimize his rule in new ways, because Bourguiba’s authoritarian bargain had come 
under threat. The result was the National Pact of 1988, where civil society and 
opposition parties were included (Murphy 1999, 174). The pact was intended to 
embody a new consensus around liberal values, but the specific promises were few. 
 Interestingly, the pact expressed a commitment by the government to honor 
human rights and civil and political freedoms (Ibid, 175). The “Tunisian Spring” was 
short-lived, however; Ben Ali used the Islamist threat from the Al-Nahda 
(“Renaissance”) Movement as a pretext for building a new security state, and for 
curbing these liberties in practice in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Ibid, 202).  As 
the years went by, it was apparent to everyone that Ben Ali’s rhetoric concerning 
constitutional safeguards and liberal democracy had only been window-dressing in a 
transitional phase (Alexander 2010, 54, 62-66).  
 Notably, the Ben Ali regime has manipulated electoral rules before every 
election; for example, by setting aside a few seats to opposition parties while at the 
same time making the latter irrelevant in the larger political context. The secular 
opposition has never had a chance to grow and reach out to the electorate, so it 
grudgingly accepted this form of co-optation in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009. At most, 
these arrangements at the mercy of the executive granted the opposition a 25% share 
of the 212 seats in the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Ibid). Secondly, parties were 
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encouraged to compete over these few seats, and the ensuing “divide-and-rule” 
arrangement benefited only the hegemonic RCD (Alexander 2010, 62-66). 
 In Morocco, the reassertion of authoritarianism has occurred in more subtle 
ways, and therefore deserves a more detailed treatise here. Since the 1990s, it has 
become clear that the regime tolerates the emergence of civil society, and that 
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of association and freedom of expression 
have been gradually accommodated both in law and practice (Layachi 1998, 69-73). 
Another noteworthy development has been the easing of repression – King Hassan II 
set free political prisoners at the end of his reign, and Mohamed VI has 
acknowledged the human rights abuses that happened during the années de plomb in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In this regard, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set 
up already in King Hassan’s days to investigate human rights abuses (Storm 2007). 
This is a very notable difference from the Tunisian context. 
 Opposition groups were allowed to form and work in Morocco, civil society 
expanded, and elections have been held regularly since the 1990s (1993, 1997, 2002, 
2007) - all to ease the pressures ensuing from economic transformation, population 
growth, rural-urban migration, unemployment, and other crises which compounded 
each other.  
 Morocco’s political party system has roots from decades back, and is 
composed of a wide specter of groups and coalitions. Analysts are quick to 
emphasize the shortcomings of this party landscape. First of all, many political 
parties have been set up by the Makhzen itself, and represent only the interests of the 
regime and the administration (Layachi 1998, 100). Secondly, all parties can be 
evaluated as organizationally weak and missing active constituencies that they can 
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mobilize to create any real counterweight to the executive or to each other (Boukhars 
2011, 61). Parties are based on corporatist loyalties and personal connections.  
 There is also a very problematic disconnect between the parties and their 
political platforms: Ideology plays no role when electoral alliances and coalitions are 
negotiated, something that confuses voters. Indeed, the liberalization of the party 
system was a slow process led “top-down” by the Monarchy, and the parties are still 
deferential to the Palace (Sater 2010, 83).  
 Boukhars claims that the King does not hesitate to exercise his powers. There 
are many anecdotes about him overturning ministerial recommendations, or issuing 
Dahirs (decrees) concerning key civil servant appointments, etc. on which the 
Ministers are not consulted. The same applies to new political initiatives, which 
originate rather with the King and his close advisors than with party politicians. 
Under Hassan II, the government functioned as a committee, the role of which was to 
implement projects emanating from the King, his private coterie of technocratic 
advisors, and the Makhzen. This purely managerial role has continued under 
Mohamed VI, even though he claims that his role only complements that of the 
Council of Ministers (Sater 2010, 83). 
 The secluded group of royal councilors effectively constitutes a shadow 
government that has much more influence than the official government. Mohamed 
VI has recruited many of the best technocrats and administrators in the country to his 
councils, and these people have often produced viable and forward-looking plans for 
further economic and administrative reforms and improvements. The problem 
remains, of course, that this group is completely exempt from any public 
accountability or scrutiny, and that decision-making procedures are opaque 
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(Boukhars 2011, 51-53).   
 Furthermore, these technocratic elites, which now head all major government 
institutions, have been co-opted by the Makhzen, and if they ever advocated any 
systemic changes, they almost always acquiesce after having been offered 
administrative influence, prestigious jobs, and high salaries (Sater 2010, 75). In some 
ways, then, the technocratic apparatus around King Mohamed VI resembles the 
administration that surrounded Ben Ali in the 1990s – the latter was seen as 
surrounding himself with a circle of managers who could implement reforms while 
being shielded from criticism. In addition, Ben Ali prevented any technocrats from 
emerging as leading personalities of their own, and he constantly shuffled them from 
position to position in order to ensure that they did not build their own patronage 
networks or constituencies (Murphy 1999, 217-218).  
 This was a contrast to his predecessor Habib Bourguiba, who had enjoyed 
being an arbiter among competing interests and networks – an open “game of divide-
and-rule” was surely Bourguiba’s leadership style (Ibid). Bourguiba was an expert at 
people management (Alexander 2010, 115), while Ben Ali ruled by means of a 
centralized, insulated technocracy (Ibid). Perhaps the Moroccan King has been able 
to do some of both  - he also enjoys a role as “supreme arbiter” among competing 
factions and interests, which he keeps tied to him at the same time (Sater 2010, 85-
86). In Tunisia, Ben Ali's increasingly insular  regime lost some of its alliances with 
key interests, meaning that it also lost legitimacy over time.  
 The Moroccan Parliamentary system I mentioned above is an example of 
Monarchic influence over the polity. The Parliament provides an arena for competing 
interests, but the King retains ultimate decision-making prerogatives (Zerhouni 2008, 
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219-220). Parties are kept weak because they fight each other, while the Assembly 
mostly serves as a “rubber stamp” to approve initiatives from the Palace without 
debate. Moroccans call it a Chambre d’enregistrement, which derogatorily means 
that it only makes records of, and adds legitimacy to, the King’s wishes (Boukhars 
2011, 44, 74). A de-legitimization of Parliament and elected politicians has only 
served the Makhzen, and underpinned the Monarch’s popularity (Zerhouni 2008, 
217- 219).  
 One case where the Makhzen might have seen its power curtailed was under 
the gouvernement d'alternance of Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi from 
1998 onwards. Youssoufi had been a long-standing opponent of King Hassan, and 
the latter appointed him to attenuate the authoritarian image of his regime. However, 
Youssoufi's power was still severely restricted by Royal prerogatives, and he had to 
rely on political forces straddling the political landscape to secure a coalition. In 
other words, this effort to “bring the Leftists to power” was unable to break with the 
democratically deficient system of the past, and King Mohamed appointed several 
technocratic Prime Ministers during the early 2000s, limiting the political legacy of 
alternance (Ibid.). 
 The main difference from Tunisia's short-lived liberalization was still that the 
Moroccan Monarchy had renegotiated its relationship with key constituencies in a 
subtle way, and without reverting to repression. This capacity to adhere to a reformist 
discourse might have shored up the King's legitimacy among important groups, while 
Ben Ali on his part was increasingly seen as aloof and corrupt. 
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III.4 The worsening Problem of Corruption 
  
 Of course, corruption has been an endemic problem both in Tunisia and 
Morocco at all levels of society. In Morocco, corruption has been a widespread 
problem throughout, and Transparency International (TI) saw Morocco dip on its 
global rankings from 45th place in 1999 to 80th in 2008 (Boukhars 2011, 26). A large 
majority of Moroccans acknowledge that corruption is deeply embedded into the 
workings of public institutions, and they find the government’s efforts against it to be 
completely ineffectual (Ibid, 27). Some will even concede that they do not think 
corruption is dysfunctional – it is just the way the Moroccan system “works” (Hibou 
and Tozy 2000). 
 According to TI again, Morocco is one of the hardest hit countries (if not the 
worst) in the entire Arab World. In 2007, the Cour des Comptes (Audit Court) 
published a much-publicized report indicting the country’s governance and 
corruption culture. It listed the paying of bribes, the recruitment of personnel based 
on connections rather than competence, waste of public funds, absenteeism among 
public officials, political and bureaucratic corruption, and clientelism of all sorts. The 
report, produced by 200 magistrates under the King’s control, testifies to the 
importance the King seemingly assigns to dealing with this dysfunctional 
administrative culture (Ibid, 26; Sater 2010, 80).  
 Acknowledging these problems might fuel sympathy towards the King’s 
reform-oriented rhetoric and enshrine his image as a paternalistic leader that wants 
the best for his country. This is in contrast to Ben Ali, who was viewed as enriching 
himself personally at the people’s expense (Beau and Tuquoi 1999). However, in the 
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Moroccan case one must also ask whether the Makhzen, the parties, and other key 
groups have an actual will or even ability to combat corruption. Mechanisms of 
patronage are assuredly at the very core of how the Makhzen runs the country. 
Privatization and deregulation of economic life has not helped, with well-positioned 
businessmen and regime figures being able to reap company shares at low prices, and 
securing access to new licenses, privileged access to credit, etc. (Sater 2010, 103; 
Younes M’Jahid, interview 2011).  
 In Tunisia, the stories about corruption multiplied over the years. Especially 
French works dig into the successive scandals in which the Ben Ali regime was 
implicated (Lamloum and Ravenel 2002, Beau and Tuquoi 1999, Beau and Graciet 
2009). The Neo-Destour party, and its successor the RCD, had always been 
clientelistic structures gravitating around the President and tying various 
constituencies and regions to his regime. In fact, some observers advance the 
contested notion that Ben Ali had merely recreated former President Habib 
Bourguiba’s populist system. 
 Observers also notice that the Tunisian authoritarian system has always been 
more populist than corporatist, meaning that the RCD, trade unions, and other key 
organizations were never intended to represent corporatist interests “upwards” in any 
way, but just to channel patronage and commands from the “top down” (Alexander 
2010, 113; Interview with Mamdouh, NGO chairman, 20115
                                                 
5 The real names of my interviewees have been kept confidential for safety reasons, except in a few 
cases where respondents explicitly gave informed consent to me using their true identity.  
). Even though this 
conclusion is probably too categorical, Ben Ali’s populist ideology gradually became 
more and more pervasive. Since the days of the National Pact in 1988, the Ben Ali 
regime had underlined the importance of a national consensus benefiting the entire 
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social body, and this notion became one of several tools to tie people to the 
paternalistic figure of the President. Additionally, incrementalism and a political 
culture of moderation were portrayed as the “Tunisian way”, thus restricting the 
public space for legitimate contention or pluralistic politics (Hibou 2011, 60). 
 The President, just like the Moroccan King, launched social development 
funds that were under his personal control6
 This clique was popularly called “Les Trabelsi”, even though they included 
more people than just the family of Leila Trabelsi, Ben Ali’s wife. She became a 
symbol of the regime’s greed, however, and at the end her family’s reputation was 
damaged beyond repair. Notably, the families were implicated in cases of outright 
theft, smuggling, and money laundering, which awarded them the nickname of 
“mafias” (Reem, Ahmed, Saida, interviews 2011; Kirkpatrick 2011). 
. While the money doled out to 
orphanages, schools, women’s leagues, et cetera as part of Ben Ali's mass politics 
was appreciated by large numbers of Tunisians, people realized that Ben Ali's state 
distributed less than what the previous regime had done before liberal reforms began. 
But most importantly, stories of corruption within Ben Ali’s inner circle proliferated 
and punched holes in the official discourse about a “welfare state” in Tunisia. While 
the RCD party and the corporatist system came under pressure from a banal 
populism, the informal circle of families around Ben Ali was monopolizing political 
and economic power.  
 The liberalization of the economy was one process they managed to 
manipulate: Few companies were privatized in Tunisia without someone from the 
“clans” obtaining inside access to shares in profitable ventures, or to lucrative 
                                                 
6 The fund known as the Fonds de solidarité Nationale was especially notorious. It was set up by 
the president himself and operated with no form of financial oversight (Hibou 2011, 194). 
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commercial licenses, or even key corporate board positions (Beau and Graciet 2009). 
Banks, infrastructure, and media were privatized in turn, always under a veil of neo-
liberal rhetoric which foreign donors and observers tended to accept at face value, 
but with assets de facto still controlled by a family that did not distinguish between 
their private finances and those of the state (Nawaat Online 2010, 34). And, 
Tunisians were aware of this – already in 1997, a secret anonymous tract had 
circulated in Tunis denouncing “tentacular corruption” (Sadiki 2002, 68). To a larger 
extent than in Morocco, economic wealth was assembled on a few hands, and the gap 
between the very rich and the increasingly poor became more and more blatant. 
 Regardless of how pervasive the manipulation of the economic sphere in 
Tunisia actually was, investors became gradually more reluctant to participate in new 
projects because the ruling families were incessantly extorting concessions and side 
payments, and because the overall investment climate turned more and more 
politicized (Haddar 2010, 64). In economic terms then, the authoritarian bargain was 
replaced by a parasitic system in Tunisia. The authoritarian bargain was of course 
never an even deal, but most people had accepted economic security in return for 
loyalty since Bourguiba’s days. Crucially, one observes that Ben Ali lost important 
alliances with the business elites and upper classes, and that he based his rule on a 
gradually narrower group of close individuals. This isolation was not balanced out by 
Ben Ali's token charitable activities, and the fact that his closes aides were widely 
resented by the people hurt his position even further. 
 At times Ben Ali leaned towards mitigating some of the negative effects of 
his own neo-liberal reforms. Hibou (2011, 182) argues that Ben Ali’s regime 
functioned as a “security pact” more than a bargain – the pact was issued and 
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enforced unilaterally by the regime over society. The security pact entailed that the 
state would protect the people against all dangers, be they political or social. It was 
first of all intended to stem the rise of Islamism, which had become the ultimate 
rationale for developing the security state. And the security forces grew 
exponentially during Ben Ali’s term, as did their surveillance powers (Hamadouche 
and Zabir 2007, 268). Commentators described the whole country as one big 
Commissariat de Police (Sadiki 2002, 68). In fact, the country had as many police 
officers as France, a country with six times its population (Schraeder and Derissi 
2011, 6).  
 While the Ben Ali regime and its ruling families were privatizing the 
economic sphere, they were also viewed as “privatizing the state,” (Hibou 2006, 196; 
Mamdouh, interview 2011) this did not just mean a delegation of regulatory or 
administrative functions. Increasingly, the traditional administrative hierarchy was 
supplanted by an informal, personal structure embedded within pre-existing 
institutions and RCD party cells. In ways reminding us of the Moroccan Makhzen, a 
new clientelist network emanated from the ruling family clique, with agents placed 
all over the official administrative apparatus. This shadowy structure equaled a “state 
within a state”, and arguably included a private police, a “private justice system”, 
and private intelligence agencies at the exclusive disposal of the inner circles of Ben 
Ali. Unlike the neo-Makhzenian institutions of Mohamed VI, Ben Ali’s private 
apparatus did not have a recognized existence and public purpose, which could have 
assigned them at least a slight degree of legitimacy. Additionally, even though this 
parallel structure was probably intended to pre-empt any challenges and 
counterbalance a lack of support outside it, it is obvious in retrospect that it was not 
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solid enough to repress the unexpected popular wave of January 2011. 
 If Ben Ali's “shadow state” turned him into an arbiter between various group 
interests and patronage networks, he did not succeed in handling this role as well as 
the Moroccan Kings usually have. They are more accustomed to facing a pluralistic 
configuration of economic interests, regional groupings, social classes, and 
bureaucratic and political circles. Indeed, the late King Hassan II was seen as a 
master of this kind of rule – he shielded the Moroccan Army from civilian meddling, 
protected his clients in the traditional Moroccan bourgeoisie, patronized the country’s 
small Jewish community, etc. (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 312-313). Even though 
the arbitrage itself was not always successful, this political dynamic ensured that the 
King remained the keystone in this structure. Mohamed VI continues to enjoy the 
same role today (Boukhars 2011, 54).  
 The problems of corruption in Tunisia and Morocco were markedly different, 
and it will be interesting to see how these differences informed the intensity of 
grievances and degrees of discontent. In Morocco, corruption was broadly seen as a 
grave but rather diffuse societal malaise. Corruption is thought of as commonplace at 
all levels, and people tend to blame highly visible senior politicians and officials. 
Nonetheless, the Monarch himself is rarely accused of direct implication in it, and 
accusations against him gain limited popular support. Thus, the King's popularity and 
prestige have been more shielded than that of the Tunisian President. Not only did 
Ben Ali not draw upon the same traditional authority as the King – people quickly 
associated him personally, and the people around him, with an unscrupulous and 
targeted exploitation of public assets. It is clear that allegations of corruption 
dramatically undermined Ben Ali's popular support.  
53 
 
III.5 Limitations on civil society in Tunisia and Morocco  
  
 We have seen how both Ben Ali and the Moroccan Kings proudly embraced 
liberal reforms that – in theory – granted an increased role to political parties, and 
maneuvering space to the opposition. This rhetoric was also embracing one of the 
fundamental pillars of political liberalization: The emancipation of organized civil 
society. Especially Morocco reveled in being labeled “a liberal Arab state” 
(Maghraoui 2008, 198).  
 Tunisia’s relapse into authoritarianism in the early 1990s was obvious. Media 
rights were constricted after a few years, and experts found evidence of human rights 
abuses. The regime clearly found human rights activists to be a nuisance, and 
promulgated a new Law of Associations in 1992. This law exposed civil society to 
infiltration by state agents, and restricted its activities (Murphy 1999, 206). The law 
succeeded in stymying much of the autonomous associational movement in Tunisia. 
Ben Ali continued to embrace a human rights discourse, but activists were 
increasingly being harassed, arrested, and targeted in other ways (Ibid. 202, 207; 
Sadiki 2002, 69-71). The Political Police and plain-clothed agents from various 
Mukhabarat agencies broke into activists’ homes, tapped their telephones, 
confiscated their passports and strove to exclude them from normal social life in as 
many was as possible (Hibou 2006, 188-189). For instance, the Tunisian Human 
Rights Association Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de L’Homme 
(LTDH) held its last Congress in 1994, because persecution of its members had 
become so preponderant. 
 The majority of journalists have also reverted to auto-censorship in order to 
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avoid any friction with the authorities. This was not only the case for state-owned 
media corporations; private Tunisian media were also confined within a system of 
political interests and ownership structures that conditioned any editorial policies 
(Sadiki 2002, 71; Marwa, interview 2011). Self-censorship is a familiar feature in the 
Moroccan media landscape as well (Younes M’Jahid, interview 2011). 
 The Ben Ali regime, on its side, continued to display its organizations, and 
boasted that Tunisia had almost 10,000 registered NGOs in the last years before 
2011. These were mostly sports clubs, youth associations, women’s leagues and other 
non-politicized organizations, and they remained, in fact, tightly controlled and 
monitored by the RCD and the state. These associations served a variety of purposes 
for the regime: They disseminated regime discourse on key issues such as women’s 
rights, children’s rights, economic development, and so on, and in reality they 
glorified Ben Ali and his initiatives (Hibou 2011, 96-98). Moreover, associations 
were useful tools for surveillance of any active individuals. This is demonstrated by 
the state’s efforts to keep accurate databases on associations and their membership. 
Finally, the state saw civil society as a useful intermediary to ensure that its programs 
of economic liberalization and rationalization progressed, maybe with civil society 
replacing some of the service provisions of a “retreating state” (Ibid.).  
 The organizations which continued to defend their autonomy, and which 
dared being critical of the regime, were exceedingly few: The LDTH, the Conseil 
National des Libertés de la Tunisie (CNLT), the Bar Association, the Journalists’ 
Syndicate and the independent Magistrates were all quite marginal. The trade union 
federation Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) was a different story: It 
has always been the single most important organization in Tunisian public life, and it 
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has maintained financial autonomy. Politically, however, the UGTT has always kept 
an ambiguous relationship with the regime. The trade union federation is too 
important for the regime to ignore or antagonize, but Ben Ali and the RCD have 
striven to co-opt and control it as much as possible, or to undermine it indirectly with 
a discourse of liberal reforms, privatization, and conformity with the demands of 
global competitiveness (Cavallo 1998, 242-246).  
 According to Hibou (2011, 124), the Ben Ali regime had mostly succeeded at 
this effort, at least at the central level of the organization. Direct conflicts between 
the trade union and the RCD became rarer over the years, and the UGTT was seen as 
another machine implementing the President’s policies, and working to ensure social 
peace. In return for the acquiescence of rank-and-file workers, cadres were enmeshed 
in the patronage networks of the regime (Ibid.). I shall return to why this assessment 
of the UGTT was fundamentally misinformed. 
 The conclusion is that Ben Ali’s Tunisia had a very marginal civil society, 
which was seemingly incapacitated from representing particular interests, advocating 
any rights and political liberties, or addressing social, economic and political issues 
with autonomy. This seems in contrast to Morocco, where civil society has been 
portrayed as much more vibrant since the 1990s.  
 In fact, Hassan II and Mohamed VI understood that civil society could act as 
a safety valve for societal pressures, and Moroccan society has also witnessed a 
proliferation of NGOs working on local development projects, charitable assistance 
to housing, advocating women’s rights and education, promoting improved care for 
children, advocating recognition of Amazigh (Berber) cultural rights and a host of 
other domains. Albeit, a vast majority of these associations are either charitable and 
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depoliticized, or working within the confines of regime approval just like in Ben 
Ali’s Tunisia (Maghraoui 1998, 198; Layachi 1998, 97-98).  
 Many NGOs have been set up by regime actors, and are not autonomous. 
Rather, the Makhzen uses these NGOs to renew its own image, conform to an 
international liberal agenda, and appropriate funds from international donors (Sater 
2007, 22). In the same vein, Moroccans typically perceive the secular and liberal 
NGOs as an elite project, and the poor prefer to revert to Islamic foundations for 
livelihood support (Ibid, 23). Formally accredited NGOs have also been set up by 
members of the professional classes or the new socioeconomic groups that have 
emerged in the wake of economic reforms, but who have felt left out from traditional 
Makhzen networks. These new organizations have therefore not prioritized reaching 
out and becoming mass movements, at least not until 2011 (Ibid, 23, 91). 
 Denoueux and Gateau (1995) argue further that the emergence of civil society 
in Morocco was an attempt by the Makhzen to pre-empt any uncontrollable 
challenges in the public domain. Slowly, public debate has been opened up and new 
issues can now be broached, but the modes of contestation and action are still strictly 
limited. Certainly, regime agents monitor the sector closely, and in particular those 
organizations that refuse co-optation. Some organizations that have been perceived 
as detrimental to regime interests took a long time to receive accreditation – one 
example being Transparency Maroc, which is the country branch of TI (Sater 2007, 
92). Even organizations that have succeeded at remaining independent have found 
themselves confined to a playing field defined by the regime in their dealing with the 
latter, and this amounts to a subtle form of co-optation as well.  
 Moreover, Sater (Ibid, 150) affirms that the Moroccan state uses another 
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classical co-optation mechanism: Resourceful people, who receive public attention 
and have “discursive power” on a certain topic, are being brought closer to the 
discussion-making center at the expense of losing their autonomy. This is an 
integrative strategy, and NGOs have frequently been asked to join consultative 
bodies, roundtable conferences, Royal Commissions, and so on. These bodies can 
then manage the deliberations on a sensitive issue, or remove it from public debate 
altogether and confine it to the Ministries in Rabat (Ibid, 153). For instance, the 
human rights organization L’Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH) is 
known for its recalcitrance and its refusal to fall for the Makhzen’s game. Even so, 
the regime set up a Ministry for Human Rights, which threatened to turn the AMDH 
into a junior partner in discussions on human rights issues (Ibid. 125; Maghraoui 
2008, 204-205).  
 Human rights issues are some of the most sensitive domains for any 
authoritarian regime, and the Moroccan regime has, in contrast to Tunisia, handled 
this issue with more diligence in the latter years. Precisely by conceding that 
violations had taken place, and by taking the initiative on human rights reform, the 
state assumed control of the direction of the human rights debate in Morocco (Sater 
2007, 123-128). The state-controlled councils eventually declared the file of 
unlawful disappearances to be “closed”, and shifted the focus towards minor 
grievances. The deep-seated corruption in the judiciary, the lack of checks and 
balances on executive power, media censorship, and limitations on the freedom of 
assembly are among the topics that the state deliberately ignores. 
 In the same way as Tunisia, the Moroccan regime has preferred to emphasize 
its achievements pertaining to social, economic and cultural rights, thus downplaying 
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the core political and civil rights of the liberal human rights paradigm (Ibid, 126). By 
focusing attention on achievements in the socio-economic fields, the authoritarian 
state has also brought back the implicit “authoritarian bargain” or “security pact”, to 
justify its unceasing grip on power. The Moroccan government has let social 
movements appear only within the confined policy domains of local development, 
women’s issues, Amazigh issues, and a few other issues. The Moroccan regime has 
also, in ways evocative of Ben Ali’s Tunisia, promoted a political ideology of 
countrywide, close-knit consensus, of moderation, and the ideal of the “law-abiding 
citizen”. This has circumscribed the repertoire of legitimate contention that 
organizations may use, something that more militant organizations have paid a high 
price for. 
 The general picture, though, is certainly that the Moroccan regime has 
adopted a more flexible approach to emerging civil society than Ben Ali ever did. 
The Moroccan regime has been prepared to absorb new tensions and issues, and as 
long as it remains the hegemonic actor in society, it has been willing to renegotiate 
the content of that hegemony on select matters (Sater 2007, Sater 2010). Mohamed 
VI's regime features prominent non-democratic features, but it has struck a new 
balance with emerging social forces in a way that Ben Ali's authoritarian state was 
never able to equal. 
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III.6 The recent economic crisis and accumulated socio-
 economic pressures 
  
 It is clear that the global economic downturn since 2008 has affected Tunisia 
and Morocco negatively, as it came on top of accumulated social and economic 
pressures. The Moroccan government claims that repeated reforms have strengthened 
the country’s ability to meet such crises. Morocco’s GDP grew despite the crisis, but 
this can also be explained by high agricultural outputs (Paciello 2010, 78). Good 
crops do not remedy the fact that Morocco has remained highly dependent on food 
imports throughout the economic downturn; with food price inflation as high as 6.8 
% in 2008. This is a bad figure, and the hike in the cost of living resulted in a surge 
of rioting and strikes in various locations countrywide. As I noted above, increased 
disenchantment equaled increased repression, for the Makhzen does not want to 
weaken its grip on society (Ibid, 94). 
 The Moroccan regime has been faced with daunting challenges related to the 
economic downturn, but it does not have a general solution for solving the multiple 
issues. The Moroccan exports sector remains vulnerable to external shocks; because 
as much as 76% of all exports go to only a few EU countries – mostly France and 
Spain - and decreased demand in these markets have an almost immediate effect on 
the local economy. In 2009, the value of exported goods overall fell by 28.1 % (Ibid. 
77). Furthermore, a global economic recession affects remittances from Moroccans 
living abroad, which constitute an important economic input (Maghraoui 2008, 202-
203). One study concluded that remittances are so important that if these flows dried 
up, an additional one million Moroccans would fall below the poverty threshold 
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(Paciello 2010, 93). 
 The short-term results of the recession have been to worsen pre-existing 
problems such as unemployment. The country needs to create 200,000 jobs a year to 
keep apace with annual additions to the labor market, but in 2009 for example, only 
95,000 jobs were created. An unknown number of jobs were lost, notably in 
important sectors such as textiles. In addition, the figures do not count jobs lost in the 
informal sector, which might represent the majority of the losses.  
The effects of the demographic youth bulge, unemployment, and rural-urban 
migration all mean that the informal sector has grown exponentially, and the regime 
has mostly tolerated its existence to ensure social peace. The economic problems 
over the last three years have also forced more people into this marché parallèle, 
where there is no legal or social protection for employees (Ibid, 90). 
 Lastly, the regime’s response to the crisis betrays the continued democratic 
deficiencies of the regime. As is often the case, the King and his advisors moved first 
to deal with the situation. All the policies drafted and decreed in response to the crisis 
emanated from this narrow circle, while civil society, and even Parliament, were 
excluded from the discussions (Ibid, 95). The Makhzen had set up a Higher Council 
for Economic Intelligence to monitor the crisis and reach out to the businesses that 
were the hardest hit, but key economic actors such as the trade unions were not 
invited to give input (Ibid.). 
 For Tunisia, the crisis also had severe effects, and further undermined 
economic growth predictions. As many as 45% of graduates could not find work, and 
unrecorded figures were much higher. Recession in Europe lead to reduced 
remittance flows, which are crucial to the economy just as in Morocco. Soaring food 
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prices also hurt lower and lower middle class families who felt the economic 
squeeze: In 2008, a Tunisian family on average spent 36% of their income on basic 
foodstuffs, which is a high figure for a country boastful of its solid middle class and 
advanced levels of development (Schraeder and Derissi 2011, 7-8). Surveys showed 
that an increasing number of Tunisians viewed their economic situation as 
deteriorating, and especially the marginalized interior regions of the country were 
suffering more than usual (Ibid, 7). And even more than in Morocco, people did not 
see Ben Ali dealing with the crisis in any credible manner, or having the legitimacy 
to do so. 
 Just as in Morocco, the informal sector had become a livelihood for those 
who could not find other jobs. This sector was vulnerable to police abuse, and 
control by businessmen who enforced mafia methods. Street vendors have had to pay 
the police to be left in peace; the criminal networks that control the sector have 
extorted bribes and commissions, and so on. There are indications that the ruling 
“Trabelsis” endeavored to monopolize the informal sector and that this further 
undermined their support among elite factions who used to profit from the same 
illegal activities (Mamdouh, interview 2011). In Morocco, the Makhzen and the 
police forces have actually left the informal sector alone after the uprisings in Tunisia 
and Egypt, to avoid any protests from originating in the streets (Hari, Tel Quel 2011, 
43). The image of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi immolating himself in Sidi 
Bouzid proved a very powerful symbol, and the Makhzen wants to forestall similar 
actions. 
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III.7 New discourses and popular responses to perceived 
 injustice 
 
 The economic transformations that I have analyzed at length here have 
compounded the growing inequalities associated with economic liberalization and 
deregulation. They have especially hurt the lower and lower middle classes, and 
splintered the middle classes into upwardly and downwardly mobile subgroups 
(Farzoun and Zacharia 1995, 275; Karim and Magnus 2008 Online). However, the 
young generations of all social groups in Middle Eastern countries have been raised 
in a new political and media reality, with new sources of information and new arenas 
for debate.  
 Some scholars argue that globalization and the emerging neo-liberal 
economic paradigm have been twinned with a liberal political discourse concerning 
democratization and human rights, and that this discourse has been propagated more 
fervently than before. Global media have played a role in this regard, by parading 
examples of democracy, human rights, accountability and transparency before their 
audiences (Cottle 2011, 650). Therefore, the argument runs, people in Middle Eastern 
countries, and especially the youth, have a deeper knowledge of these ideals than 
ever before, and they are aware of the shortcomings of their own authoritarian 
systems. The simple fact that authoritarian leaders increasingly strive to maintain a 
liberal façade in their interactions with donors and “Western” powers is interpreted 
as evidence that liberal democratic values have gained prominence as the new global 
standard. In addition, there is a new set of global institutions and organizations that 
promote and enforce human rights with more power than before. The International 
63 
 
Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), for instance, 
represent this new paradigm (Koo and Ramirez 2009; Howard-Hassmann 2005). 
 Both Ben Ali and Mohamed VI claimed that they had brought their countries 
into the era of liberal democracy, human rights, and socio-economic rights and 
entitlements. The examples treated at length above demonstrate that this has been 
rhetoric with little or no real impact, but it has nonetheless put authoritarian 
presidents like Ben Ali in a dilemma. A contrasting claim made in the debate over 
democratization prospects in the Middle East is that “Western” powers, i.e. the USA 
and the European Union, have refrained from exerting much pressure on Arab states, 
worrying more about their own strategic interests and maintaining alliances with 
“friendly autocrats” than calling for genuine political reform (Kherigi 2011). 
 Howbeit, the ascendance of a global paradigm on human rights has also 
trickled down to key groups in the Arab world. Such a discourse has arguably had an 
uneven impact: The uneven access to resources such as Internet in the region has 
limited its expansion. The distribution of such resources typically correlates with 
disparities in levels of education and income as well.  
 
Table I. Percentage of Individuals using the Internet in Tunisia and Morocco 
2009-20107
Country /Year 
 
2009 2010 
Tunisia  41.3 49 
Morocco 34.1 36.8 
 
 
                                                 
7 Source: International Telecommunications Union 2012. Free Statistics Database Online. URL: 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ (accessed January 25, 2012). It is interesting to note that the 
percentage of Internet users does not vary with the scale of mobilization during protests. Access to 
Internet might help explain how certain discourses are disseminated, but not why protesters were 
relatively more numerous in Tunisia than in Morocco. 
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Table II. Literacy Rates and Gross Enrollment in Tertiary Education in Tunisia 
and Morocco8
 
 
Totalt Adult Literacy Rate Youth (15-24) 
Literacy Rate  
Gross Enrollment 
Ratios 
Country/Unit % % % 
Tunisia 78 77.9 34 
Morocco 55 96.8 13 
 
 
A different perspective altogether is that people did not need a thorough 
cognizance of human rights or democracy to experience a deep sensation of 
humiliation from years of enduring corruption, repression, and marginalization. As 
we shall see, activists in Tunisia thought there was an inherent need and natural 
desire to do something about their situation (Ahmed, interview 2011).  
Another inference to keep from my argument so far is that the picture of 
North African countries transforming their economies and undercutting side-
payments to domestic groups and thus breaking off the authoritarian bargain could be 
more nuanced than first envisaged. At least in Tunisia economic growth has been 
impressive in a regional context, and observers should keep in mind that perceptions 
of a decline in regime  legitimacy there could flow from certain perceptions of 
corruption and power abuses, and a lack of fundamental rights and freedoms, just as 
well as from purely economic grievances. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Sources: UNESCO 2012. Higher Education Statistics Online. URL: 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/tertiary-education.aspx (accessed January 25, 2012), 
and World Bank 2012. World Bank Country Database Online. URL: data.worldbank.org/country 
(accessed January 25, 2012). Both databases warn of major gender, income and regional 
disparities within each category and each country. Enrollment in higher education is clealry much 
more prevalent in Tunisia. It is interesting to note that youth literacy rates are high for both 
countries. 
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III.8 Laying the groundwork for protest: A Summary 
 
 To sum up all the preceding pages, one can compare the situation in Morocco 
and Tunisia and outline similarities and differences. The regimes have dealt with 
economic restructuring for decades, but despite the self-congratulatory rhetoric and 
positive statistics, results have been mixed. Macroeconomic stability has not been 
combined with thorough institutional reform, with transparent privatization, or 
successful attempts to relieve the aggravating socio-economic pressures which 
rationalization, increasing economic competition, the demographic explosion, and 
inadequate education systems have brought on the most vulnerable sectors in society.  
 More precisely, neo-liberal reforms have in particular affected the middle 
classes that used to enjoy corporatist privileges under the previous economic order. 
The disenchantment of this politically crucial class should ring the alarm bells of any 
regime. In both Tunisia and Morocco, social unrest in the 1980s and 1990s 
inaugurated an era of political liberalization, at least on paper. Morocco did install 
genuine reforms and saw a gradual opening of its political space to various voices 
and grievances. At the same time, the rates of development of the Moroccan 
economy remained weaker than in Tunisia, where the Ben Ali regime could 
legitimize its authoritarianism with a discourse of promoting economic growth and 
fighting Islamists. The paranoid Tunisian regime labored relentlessly to stifle all 
kinds of dissent and eradicate an autonomous civil society from the early 1990s 
onwards. 
 The Moroccan regime also used a discourse of consensus and royal populism 
to restrain civil society. It permitted debate on new issues, but kept a monopoly on 
66 
 
defining the ways in which the debate was to take place, and how to implement 
eventual reforms. Moroccan society has seen a number of new organizations, parties, 
economic and social interests emerge, while the regime has inscribed a sphere of 
“tolerated criticism” from which the Monarch and his Makhzen network are exempt.  
 All in all, I argue that Morocco took a markedly different path than Tunisia in 
the 1990s, and that its interaction with contentious actors reduced the potential for 
intense conflict between the regime and challenging forces at a later stage. Besides, 
the Tunisian regime suffered more than the Moroccan one from popular resentment 
at its corruption and power abuse: People saw a distorted mirror image of their own 
grievances in the opulent lifestyle of the Trabelsi family. With few or no channels for 
meaningful claims-making, street action has frequently been the last option for 
aggrieved groups. In 2010-2011 people in both countries took to the streets again in 
protest, but this time discontent proved to be of an unprecedented magnitude. 
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IV – Mobilization under adverse conditions 
 
IV.1 Articulating grievances and mobilizing consensus 
 
 The preceding sections demonstrated that the first hypothesis of our 
conceptual model on mobilization is valid – social and economic problems had 
accumulated in Tunisia and Morocco over the last decades, while reform was stifled 
by authoritarian regimes intent on preserving the political status quo at all costs. The 
way from this situation to a full-scale eruption of protests is a complex one, however, 
and the following pages shall map out and compare how these processes took place 
in Tunisia and Morocco, and help us assess our other hypotheses.  
 Doug McAdam (1981, 51) has ascertained that grievances have to be 
collectively expressed and defined in order to form a basis for collective action. 
Authoritarian and repressive regimes usually nurture a “political culture of fear”, 
which is obviously not conducive to the public expression of political opposition. It 
follows that in Tunisian and Moroccan societies, the act of sharing grievances has 
been mostly low-key, subtle, and restricted in scope. 
 Needless to say, substantial groups in both countries have felt socio-economic 
problems affect their daily lives in the form of unemployment, pauperization, rise in 
the cost of living, and so forth. People who have experienced this deterioration as 
unjust will seek recognition and confirmation of their problems in discussions with 
others; in cafés and marketplaces, in mosques and on the streets, and at the family 
table. Naturally, the higher the concentration of people concerned, the more likely it 
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is that the people affected will interact, and the larger the mobilization potential is. 
 Klandermans (1997, 20) echoes other political sociologists who have 
confirmed that interpersonal interactions between family, friends and colleagues play 
an essential role in the appropriation of collective beliefs. People usually seek to 
validate their own beliefs in interaction with significant others – who are often like-
minded individuals. Such informal discourse will inevitably be contingent on local 
circumstances and the idiosyncratic grievances and interests of people involved, and 
in both Tunisia and Morocco several steps had to be accomplished to go from shared 
discourse to street action. Moreover, it is very hard to detect and gauge the extent of 
such everyday interaction by unemployed people, street vendors, and café patrons, 
and this can explain why the unrest came as such a surprise for both political leaders 
and Western onlookers. In other words, the people sharing this discourse might 
gradually embolden each other to act, while people outside it remain unaware of this 
relative strengthening of segments of the public. 
 In both Tunisia and Morocco, interview respondents acknowledge that these 
processes of collective framing were taking place prior to the winter of 2010/2011, 
although the political circumstances were different in each country. As we noted 
earlier, it is easier to construct a shared identity in opposition to an “adversary” when 
this adversary is clearly known (Gamson 1995, 90). In Tunisia, the political regime 
revolved around Ben Ali and the cult of his person and political initiatives. It was 
therefore natural for people to hold Ben Ali responsible for how things went in the 
country.  
 Ben Ali had been in power for over two decades, and he was an old man. As 
an interview respondent affirmed, there was a growing understanding that the 
69 
 
political situation in the country had to change (Amir, interview 2011). Saida, a 
journalist and street activist in Tunis, agreed that there was disquiet concerning who 
would inherit power at the Palace in Carthage, because Ben Ali had no heir apparent 
(Interview 2011). In particular, people feared that Laila Trabelsi herself would 
maneuver to control the selection process for a new leadership. In Morocco, on the 
other hand, King Mohamed VI had been in power for merely a decade when protests 
erupted, and he is still considered to be a young and dynamic leader by many 
Moroccans.  
 We have already touched upon the differences in how corruption was 
perceived in both countries. A prominent political analyst and NGO chairman, 
Mamdouh, attested to the impression that Ben Ali was directly implicated in 
corruption of all sorts, and that his wife, Leila Trabelsi, was a leading crony 
(Interview 2011). The popular discourse about her was especially pungent. 
Respondents ranging from UGTT secretaries to journalists portray Trabelsi as a 
vehemently disliked icon of greed and rapacity, heading a dynasty viewed as “out of 
control”. The outrage felt by most Tunisians at this corruption demonstrates how 
unjust people felt such practices to be. To revert to Klandermans (1997, 38), there 
was both indignation at the illegitimate (and growing) inequality between the Ben 
Ali/Trabelsi clans and the rest of society, and at the totally immoral ways in which 
their wealth had been accumulated. Tunisians perceived a deepening corruption in 
their society, and more decisively, they perceived that the President himself was 
more responsible than anyone for facilitating it.  
 Corruption has been plaguing Morocco as well, but it is less associated with 
the uppermost echelon of power than in Tunisia. Younes M’Jahid concurred with 
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Transparency Maroc that privatization has been skewed in favor of the politically 
well connected, and that rentier practices have not been abolished (Interviews 2011). 
Fundamentally, economic reform has only created new forms of dependence between 
the state and society in Morocco. However, the monarch himself is perched above 
the scandals of the Moroccan regime. Protesters have often brought pictures of the 
King with them to sit-ins and have begged him to solve their problems, since 
politicians have been unable to do so (Ibid). The King is widely respected and his 
position is founded on a strong traditional imagery and religious authority which 
shields him from criticism.  
 The Monarchy deflects accusations of corruption and mismanagement to the 
higher levels of politicians, and bypasses a discredited executive in order to nurture 
its support directly with the people. Hence, the King skillfully blurs the fact that he is 
in the last instance responsible for nominating the government and intervening in 
lucrative business deals (Interviews 2011). Even though corruption and 
mismanagement have added to a discourse of alienation between Moroccan society 
and a predatory state, the demands for change have been more limited and more 
diffuse than they ever were in Tunisia – in large part because the authorities of Ben 
Ali and Mohamed VI have been perceived so differently. 
 Moving on, we must also keep in mind that although collective 
understandings on socioeconomic and political problems were widespread 
throughout the Tunisian and Moroccan societies, their impacts were different across 
different social classes, and many people actually never shared these interpretations. 
Representatives from Transparency Maroc and other Moroccan activists conceded 
that the regime had been able to “buy” poor people’s acquiescence with cheap bread, 
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Ramadan meals, and other populist initiatives (Interviews 2011). On the other hand, 
the case of Tunisia illustrates that members of the higher classes had just as often 
abstained from any political activism prior to the mass mobilization of January 2011. 
Our informant Saida, a journalist with an upper-middle class background, put it like 
this:  
 
 “I believed in Ben Ali’s regime, I believed in the propaganda. I thought 
 Tunisia was doing well, we were a very successful country, but we were 
 not ready for democracy. Like most Tunisians, I was part of the passive, 
 silent majority. We were disconnected from reality until Sidi Bouzid 
 happened. December 17, 2010 was a shock for me” (Interview 2011). 
 
 In other words, one must be careful not to believe that all parts of 
society were brewing with discontent. Some did not have the resources to 
participate, while others benefited from the status quo. In a country such as 
Tunisia, with high literacy and education rates and less poverty, one can assume 
that a higher proportion of the population was politically conscious than in 
poorer Morocco. Before the protests, however, the Ben Ali regime was adept at 
stifling critical thought. Amira, another journalist and former social worker, 
meant that “we were asphyxiated, for regime collaborators monitored everyone 
else”. The regime had quenched any form of autonomous expression, be it in 
the arts, the academy, the media, or in politics: “There was a war on ambition 
and free thinking” (Amira, interview 2011). 
 The unemployed of Tunisia, and in particular unemployed youth, 
represented a “Generation X” that both the regime and society had neglected 
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(Ibid.) Together with the downwardly mobile segments of a middle class under 
pressure, and the outright poor, they amounted to a large and varied group with 
multiple social and economic problems. Seeing no hope, they were often 
underemployed street vendors, beggars, delinquents, and even criminals. This 
situation was especially severe in the interior and the south of Tunisia, which 
have always been at the country’s economic and political periphery.  
 People in these strata and regions have typically advanced specific 
claims for jobs and bread, reminiscent of the demands of Morocco’s poor. Such 
demands might have appeared limited to immediate economic and social 
concerns, but in fact they were more politically powerful than that. Street 
activists Reem, Amira, and others stressed the fact that these groups had had to 
endure a deeply felt humiliation derived from their situation, and from the way 
they were treated by the state (interviews 2011). Of course they wanted formal 
jobs, because jobs ensure at least some degree of economic security, personal 
dignity, and autonomy, both from family members and the state. 
 Instead, the unemployed, informally employed, and underemployed all 
remained at the margins of their societies (Amira, interview 2011). Ironically, 
these marginalized strata actually encompassed the majority of people in many 
poor towns and neighborhoods, and their frustration added to the growing 
mobilization potential. Governments were of course worried about the 
possibility for unrest, and sometimes used employment programs to co-opt 
graduates. As Hibou (2011, 192) states for the case of Tunisia, such Chantiers 
de Travail only succeeded in reinforcing the feeling of dependency of the youth 
(and hence their sense of humiliation) on the authoritarian state. Driven by the 
73 
 
state’s incessant need to control these groups, the police treated them abusively, 
frisked them, and beat them (Hanafi 2011 Online; Amira, et al. interviews July 
2011). Altogether, these groups were profoundly dehumanized. The 
mortification resulting from this relation to the state added to the humiliation of 
not having work in the first place, and of being ignored or considered of lesser 
worth, which turned into an explosive mix that drove Mohamed Bouazizi to 
commit suicide, and many people to identify with his desperation (Kefi 2011).  
 In the least, this has become the dominant narrative of how grievances 
accumulated among numerous Tunisians, and how one man saw no other way 
out than to enact an extreme form of protest. Soon, people in the periphery, the 
unemployed, and in particular the youth, descended on the streets demanding 
Dignity! (Reem, et al.  2011). This was a momentous development: Asking for 
dignity arguably entailed the wholesale rejection of an entire set of illegitimate 
power practices and social and economic relations, escalating in a matter of 
weeks to an outright rejection of the Ben Ali regime. Maha, a member of the 
human rights organization CNLT in Tunis, emphasized how the slogan “bread, 
water, and Ben Ali out!” had appeared only a few days after December 17. 
Others were quick to underline that Tunisians label their uprising “La 
Révolution de la Dignité” (Maha, Reem, et al., interviews 2011). 
 We now understand how a certain consensus had been propagated 
incrementally in Tunisia and Morocco, founded on fundamental economic and 
socio-political problems. The discourse led to a convergence of understandings 
– a sort of alignment of individual frames and the gradual emergence of shared 
frames. As the journalist Ramzi insisted, the process had been individual and 
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“psychological” as well as collective (Interview 2011). Innumerable 
interpersonal interactions fostered discourses, shared by a few people at a time, 
which confirmed the hardships felt by their members. Typically, these local 
groups consisted of people with shared social backgrounds, which in turn 
facilitated the creation of shared identities (Klandermans 1997, 20). The fact 
that the grievances of these people were so basic (for instance jobs and cheaper 
food) made consensus generation easier. Interestingly, I have noted that in the 
Tunisian context the many local, particularistic discourses revolving around the 
need for employment and food could easily be embedded into a larger frame, 
calling for the restoration of dignity for all. Crucially, this rallying cry did not 
gain the same momentum in Morocco as it did in Tunisia, and we shall see that 
this has had consequences for mobilization there. 
 Mass protests do not arise in a political vacuum, and one must not forget 
that both Tunisia and Morocco had histories of riots. In Morocco, riots occurred 
intermittently throughout the country in the 1990s and early 2000s, and people 
were accustomed to them as a local, contingent way of expressing grievances. 
In Tunisia, the effects of harsher repression, tighter regime control over 
information, and higher economic growth, meant that reported incidents of riots 
were few until the early 2000s.   
 However, more than one Tunisian interviewee highlighted that the unrest 
in the mining town of Gafsa in 2008 turned out to be a groundbreaking event, 
paving the way for the 2011 mass protests (Amir, interview 2011). The Gafsa 
riots were a response to the nepotism of local mining company officials, and 
were met with heavy repression. When asked why the Gafsa riots did not set off 
75 
 
countrywide protests, respondents pointed out that it was more difficult to relay 
information from the area back then. For instance, Facebook and Twitter were 
not commonly used at the time (Reem, Amir, interviews 2011). Furthermore, 
members of the trade union UGTT and lawyers from the Tunisian Bar 
Association stated frankly that although their members mobilized in Gafsa, 
there were few attempts to mobilize elsewhere in sympathy (Interviews 2011). 
Gafsa ultimately failed, but Amir and other activists recognize that it set an 
example for others, and that it helped cracking the “wall of fear” that the 
Tunisian regime had erected (Interviews 2011). 
 Gafsa left Tunisia simmering with tension, and fed into the oppositional 
collective frames already existing. Although many were not aware of what was 
going back in 2008, interviewees concur that Gafsa was an important example, 
which means that its story must have circulated in Tunisia in the years 
following the events. Narratives such as that of Gafsa surely helped to enhance 
people’s shared understanding that they were united in their plight, and that 
some had the courage to rise up. 
 Even Tunis City experienced its own acts of resistance before Bouazizi, 
curiously with soccer hooligans playing a big role. Dating back to around 2006, 
gangs named “Les Ultras” were battling the police at sports events, and they 
mostly managed to keep the security forces at bay. Blogger Reem and journalist 
Ramzi both credited these groups for dismantling the image of an “invincible” 
police, and showing people that street action was indeed feasible (Interviews 
2011). This process undoubtedly contributed to the agency – factor - the all-
important conviction that something could be done. In the dense urban quarters 
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of Tunis, the narratives about the Ultras’ achievements flowed easily into other 
narratives about popular resistance, slowly altering people’s perceptions of 
political opportunities and laying the groundwork for contention. 
  The riots at Gafsa and the running battles at soccer matches in Tunis 
were localized eruptions of anger, often with targets immediately present, and 
restrained by the limited resources of protesters. For a nationwide awareness to 
gain momentum, protesters needed communication tools to spread their 
message quickly. As we have already seen, conventional media such as 
television, radio, and newspapers were in no way able to disseminate the 
discourse of grievances and protest. However, people were getting their 
information from other sources, notably from international satellite broadcasters 
and the Internet. When as many as one in five Tunisians were maintaining a 
profile on Facebook, and one out of two were having regular access to the 
Internet, unfiltered news, and knowledge about the malpractices of Ben Ali’s 
regime, could be distributed instantly (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 11).  
  Interviewees highlighted how the use of social media evolved, turning 
them into political forums around the time when protests first broke out. The 
Tunisian government ran the infamous Ammar404 censorship technology, one 
of the most restrictive in the world at the time (Mhenni 2008, Online). Already 
in early 2010 a loosely organized movement of bloggers had demonstrated 
against Internet censorship in Tunisia, using music, T-shirt logos, and other 
innovative expressions of protest (Maha, interview 2011). Two bloggers were 
arrested, but their fledgling freedom of expression movement got a lot of 
attention. Many “tech-savvy” Tunisians, who even had middle-class 
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backgrounds and had benefited from Tunisia’s liberalized economy, understood 
that there was an urgent need to deal with Ben Ali’s censorship, oppression and 
power abuses. In other words, Tunisia’s mobilization potential increased 
sharply.  
 In addition, activist Saida recognized that scandals revealed by 
Wikileaks had added to the simmering resentment. US Ambassadors had 
written frankly about the rampant corruption and dictatorial practices of the Ben 
Ali regime (Nawaat Online 2010). One thing was to hear stories in cafés and 
rumors among friends – getting these stories confirmed by official American 
correspondence made people more confident in their collective beliefs (Saida, 
interview 2011). Again, one realizes that the alienation between regime and the 
rest of society amounted to a kind of political opportunity change, albeit a 
change that was difficult to detect. Tarrow (1998, 77) generally dismisses 
opportunity changes that pass unnoticed. I argue that in this case changes were 
not structural or external to the actors involved, but pertained to their individual 
experiences and intersubjective frames. This had consequences for people’s 
sense of injustice, agency and shared identity. These were emboldened, but the 
enduring stability of the Ben Ali regime made a major revolt seem unlikely to 
most observers.  
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IV.2 Mobilization online and mobilization in the streets 
 
 On December 17 2010, Tunisia was ripe for protest. The following 
pages will attempt to give an overview of these events. It is important to keep in 
mind that revolutions can never be accurately predicted, and that there was 
nothing inevitable about the ways events actually unfolded. Structural problems 
had piled up all over the Middle East and North Africa, and finally, one spark 
was enough to set the country ablaze. 
 Mohamed Bouazizi’s hometown Sidi Bouzid was shaken by riots on the 
first few days after December 17, and crucially, neighboring towns started to 
mobilize in support. At the village and town level, the strong bonds of 
communal solidarity and shared identity made local riots and sit-ins quite easy 
to organize. However, police brutality began immediately, and fear was 
evidently a major hurdle to the sustaining of protests. One must keep in mind 
that these communities had collective memories of earlier contention, and they 
were well aware of the risks. 
 There are somewhat divergent narratives concerning how mobilization 
gained momentum, and these narratives can generally be grouped into two 
categories. The first interpretation, adhered to especially by the young and the 
cyber-activists, emphasizes how new social media, and in particular Facebook, 
functioned as a “press agency”, and a convenient tool for coordinating the dates 
and locations of demonstrations, inviting people to join, and disseminating anti-
regime discourse in general. People subscribing to this narrative highlight that 
Facebook was only a tool to relay information – no one was able to successfully 
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assume leadership of the online movement. With its horizontal and inherently 
democratic structure, Facebook functioned to coordinate what was a close 
approximation to a “leaderless, spontaneous” community. However, it proved 
an invaluable resource, a fact which signs in Tunis saying “Merci Facebook” 
testify to.  
 We have already seen how great the reach of online social media in 
Tunisia was, and local communities and circles of friends could transmit 
information to those who were not directly connected. This amounts to what 
Denoueux (1993) calls informal mobilization, a process that typically occurs in 
times of crisis, when people are mobilized not by formal organizations but by 
networks existing at the workplace, in neighborhoods, or among friends. In his 
book Urban Unrest in the Middle East, Denoueux illustrates this concept with 
examples from Beirut and Cairo.  
 The spreading of protests from Sidi Bouzid to neighboring towns was a 
pivotal first step in drawing the entire country’s attention to local events. In the 
town of Kasserine, police responded to demonstrations with shocking brutality. 
Hundreds were killed over the space of a month – more than fifty were killed on 
the weekend of 8-10 January alone, as the police targeted funeral processions in 
particular. They placed snipers on rooftops and shot at women and children 
indiscriminately, while the Ministry of Interior called the police violence “acts 
of self defense” against attackers and looters (The Telegraph 2011). Maha, the 
CNLT member, explained that the regime paid casseurs, or vandals, to break 
shops and sow chaos, providing the security forces with an excuse to attack 
anyone who dared leave their homes (Interview 2011). 
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 From the very first clashes in Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, video clips, 
pictures, “Tweets”, and Facebook updates were posted, providing a live feed of 
horrifying, poignant images. Ramzi and other informants found it difficult to 
explain precisely why people continued to take to the streets under these dire, 
life-threatening conditions, but they all made reference to the instinctive impact 
of emotions (Interviews 2011; Miladi 2011) 
 Arguably, people did not make a calculated rational decision as to 
whether they should march in the streets or not. The videos of police brutality 
posted on Facebook and YouTube became a spectacle to which people could not 
stay neutral. Shaken by anger and desperation, they kept returning to the streets 
despite the risks (Maha, interview 2011). Tarrow’s (1998, 83) models 
acknowledge this mechanism of mobilization: Ruthless repression 
paradoxically facilitates outrage, which might drive protests. With repression 
and humiliation becoming so palpable, many felt that they had little to lose as 
individuals; while conversely, the stakes for their communities were becoming 
higher by the day. Saad, member of the LTDH, suggested: “The regime was 
dressed down, exposed as totally tyrannical against its own people. Some of us 
had known this for a long time...for others, the violence was a wake-up call” 
(interview 2011). Maha’s argument is similar: “there was a human sentiment – 
an emotional aspect (…), and Facebook was a platform for provoking and 
expressing these feelings” (Interview 2011). Referring to Kriesi et al. (1995, 5). 
I see that audiovisual media helped politicalize more of the already existing 
mobilization potential in the country. People who had no previous experience 
with expressing their grievances in public gathered in front of the Ministry of 
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the Interior in Tunis, crying: “You are killing the people, killing the youth!” 
(Saida, interview 2011). 
 Harking back to our model, I clearly see that disproportionate repression 
fueled an intense feeling of injustice. The rupture between regime and society 
was total, and it was easy for people to identify Ben Ali and his system as their 
adversary, the concrete target of anger. After mobilization first accelerated, this 
process became a rapid, self-reinforcing phenomenon, with people finding 
safety in numbers. The spreading of protests increased people’s feeling of 
agency, invigorating the shared belief that they could accomplish something as 
a collective (Klandermans 1997, 42).  
 Online social media were fused directly into all these processes. When 
information was relayed across the country, more people were touched by 
highly emotional narratives and images, and more people felt that they too had 
a stake in the collective of protesters. The activists I interviewed commonly 
believed that the situation had reached a sort of nationwide “tipping point” that 
had made people descend into the streets almost simultaneously. However, I 
must point out the evident fact that not everyone joined the protests from the 
start. Reem and Saida both exemplify how mobilization spread by example: 
Activists who were more aware of the unrest and its causes, who felt a strong 
emotional impact from repression, or were simply committed to supporting the 
movement early on, pioneered by posting images, status updates, and blog posts 
online.  
 These cyber-activists were braving a certain risk of being monitored, 
harassed, or even detained, and a few among them also experienced this. 
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Among others, the regime arrested Lina Ben Mhenni, Slim Amamou, and 
Yassine Ayari, whose influence it found worrying. These bloggers had been 
active online and in the freedom of speech movement for some time. They had 
begun the campaign to draw attention to the fledgling unrest in December 2010 
and mobilize in sympathy (Cyberdissidents.org 2011). Arrests also conferred a 
symbolic role on detained individuals (Reporters sans Frontières 2011). Despite 
the salient public profile of these activists, they did not lead the movement: 
Rather, committed citizens at all levels played an invaluable role in initiating 
and spreading mobilization9
 Saida, who had a substantial audience due to her radio shows, recalled: 
“(...) in December, when I broke the silence about the repression, people started 
being afraid of being my friends on Facebook!” (Interview 2011). Fear of the 
regime had not lost its grip just yet. According to Reem, when her friends saw 
that she was not punished for her online activity, that she was not arrested and 
her accounts not hacked, they followed in her footsteps (Interview 2011). 
Importantly, these activists acted as opinion leaders in their respective social 
milieus.  
.  
 In a matter of weeks, even the “passive majority” in Tunisia was stirred. 
Many were initiated into the action frame of grievances and humiliation for the 
first time, and went through the steps of consensus mobilization (awareness-
raising) and action mobilization only in a matter of days. The fundamental 
character of the popular demands made it possible to construct the necessary 
                                                 
9 It is interesting to note that there is a lot of controversy surrounding leading bloggers in Tunisia, 
and that everyone I interviewed objected to the idea that these personalities constituted any form 
of moral or organizational “leadership” of the protests. Rather, they functioned as figureheads, 
even though there is no consensus on their importance (Interviews 2011). 
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shared identity around them, spanning gender, age, socio-economic, and 
cultural differences. Online social media made it possible for people to feel part 
of a new nationwide community, beyond their face-to-face interactions with 
friends and neighbors. Particular grievances at the level of towns and villages 
were actively renegotiated and assembled into a nationwide political frame.  
 The Tunisian protests of December and January 2010/2011 are arguably 
a qualitatively new phenomenon, in that online social media played such a key 
role. According to one account, “people protested in the streets during the day, 
and shared information online at night” (Mandraud 2011)10
 It might appear that coordination online substituted for the need to set up 
a coherent, organized movement on the ground, as Social Movement Theories 
normally presuppose (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow, Tilly and McAdam 2001). 
Kriesi et al. purport that a mobilization potential (i.e. people sharing awareness 
about shared grievances) needs a framework of both formal organizations and 
informal personal networks in order to actually mobilize (1995). Facebook, on 
. The mise en scène 
of a protest movement had become easier than ever before (Zekry, interview 
2011). Networks of online activists working under oppressive conditions also 
had the advantage of not having a clear center or headquarter which the regime 
could target and paralyze. (Al Saffar 2011).  
                                                 
10  Furthermore, international attention to the events could be garnered when mainstream 
media, and in particular Al Jazeera, picked up information, images and videos from online 
platforms and broadcast them to global audiences. The growing global attention to events in 
Tunisia and later other Arab countries surely multiplied the pressure on the Ben Ali regime, and 
undermined its legitimacy further. Cottle (2011, 655) argues that the disturbing images from the 
protests in Arab countries increased the pressure on “Western” governments to demand that 
authoritarian leaders step down. Tunisia was the first theatre of the “Arab Spring”, and the 
international pressure on Ben Ali was arguably too timid at that point to compel his departure.  
 However, activists from the “Anonymous” hacker network attacked the Tunisian 
government. This campaign, and support from a range of foreign non-governmental actors, 
boosted the morale among Tunisian protesters (Reem, interview 2011; Miladi 2011; Ryan 
2011). 
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the other hand, permitted the creation of loosely bound communities that could 
be created and dissolved in an instant, removing constraints of time and space, 
and making communication virtually effortless. Youth with no political 
experience could thus transform into activists overnight.  
 A lot of the youth were also careful to claim that they were not “political 
in the traditional sense”, and that online coordination had not created a lasting 
political movement (Reem, Ahmed, et al. interviews 2011). Further, youth 
activists and journalists that I interviewed argued unequivocally that traditional 
Tunisian NGOs had not initiated the wave of protests, but had merely tried to 
catch up with, and control, its development (Ibid. 2011). 
 Reem for instance, claimed that she did not want to be associated with 
any particular activist collective, and that this was not a necessary precondition 
to “make a difference” online (Interview 2011). Interestingly, several other 
interviewees were also skeptical of the more highly profiled activists and their 
agendas. Facebook clearly allowed people to maintain their strong sense of 
individuality and to converge selectively around a few topics, rather than the 
deeper cultural and social integration which activism in more “traditional” 
organizations arguably requires (Wanous, Rechers and Malik 1984, 671).  
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IV.3 Civil society and the popular movement in Tunisia 
 
 This is where I must introduce the other narrative on how mobilization 
occurred, the narrative proposed by members of “traditional” and formal civil 
society, such as the UGTT and the Tunisian Bar Association. Arguably, the 
ephemeral collective identities nurtured on Facebook were not sufficient to 
sustain widespread street action in the face of relentless repression. 
 For example, UGTT members claimed that their cadres in Sidi Bouzid 
and elsewhere were among the first to call for protests (UGTT Sousse, 
interviews 2011). They were proud of the UGTT’s tradition as a counterweight 
to the regime, and as a force the regime could not ignore. According to its 
representatives in Sousse, the UGTT had consistently advocated freedom of 
association, freedom of expression, and workers’ rights for many years. 
 External observers have asserted that the UGTT had been suffering from 
a deepening division between its activist local branches and the more 
accommodationist, i.e. co-opted, central bureau over the last few years (Ryan 
2011). However, it is important not to let the passivity of the central level 
overshadow the important role played by the lower cadres during the uprising. 
Some accounts also perceive a deliberate two-pronged strategy of the UGTT 
during these critical days: The UGTT central bureau was negotiating with Ben 
Ali, while the regional offices were adding pressure on him in the streets. The 
local sections of the UGTT could also take the initiative because they were 
further removed from the regime’s coercive capacities and closer to problems 
“on the ground” (UGTT Sousse, interviews 2011; Hanafi 2011). Overall, the 
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activism of the UGTT during the pre-January 14 unrest proves in any case that 
the organization had never been totally co-opted by Ben Ali. Critics who argued 
otherwise had  overlooked both the size of the organization and its historical 
role. The UGTT was indeed older than the Tunisian state structure itself, and a 
lot of the Tunisian leadership had acquired political training within its ranks 
(Perkins 2007). If the rest of Tunisian civil society was weak, the UGTT was 
strong and could become the backbone for protests. 
 In contrast with the riots in 2008, this time the UGTT cadres were ready 
to mobilize in sympathy all over the country. Branch offices were well 
connected and well coordinated, and collaborated also with smaller groups such 
as the lawyers and the LTDH. The UGTT was effectively a well-established 
mass movement, with its own organizational resources, its massive rank-and-
file of more than 500,000 members, sharing an identity that was conducive to 
supporting popular socio-economic and political demands. Lastly, its cadres 
were already skilled at organizing demonstrations. Therefore, the UGTT 
claimed that it had been able to “frame and supervise”11
 For the trade unionists, protesting was a “duty”, even though repression 
continued to be horrendous, and the casualties were many (Ibid). Joining the 
union members at the forefront of demonstrations were the lawyers, easily 
recognizable in their black robes. Zekry, a member of the Bar Association in 
 the mass protests when 
they erupted (Ibid). It used text messages, notices, and improvised outdoor 
meetings to rally supporters, and marches in major cities typically began at 
UGTT offices.  
                                                 
11 The French term “encadrer”, which was used by interviewees here, is difficult to translate. 
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Tunis, emphasized how Tunisia’s lawyers had been advocating the rule of law 
and fair trials for a century, and detailed how Ben Ali had always sought to 
undermine the profession and its guild (Interview 2011). The Bar Association 
embodied a strong ethos of opposition to Ben Ali’s unfettered autocracy, and 
because of its standing in Tunisian society and its esprit de corps, its members 
had dared critique Ben Ali more openly than most. In retaliation, outspoken 
lawyers had received threats, been harassed by police, and thrown in jail (Ibid). 
The lawyers also shared an acute sense of representing a resourceful, cultivated 
leadership in Tunisian society, and a competent avant-garde to the January 
protests.  
 The Bar’s local branches had taken the initiative to rallies in 
collaboration with the trade unionists and other groups. The Bar Association’s 
Head Office in Tunis knew what was stirring at any time, and approved street 
action. On December 30, thousands of lawyers decided to wear black mourning 
bands to commemorate the victims of police brutality. The police responded by 
harassing them in the streets, and Zekry himself believed this had been a wake-
up call for many ordinary Tunisians (Ibid). From then on, the lawyers 
symbolized the opposition to the regime. On January 3, when schools and 
universities were supposed to have opened after New Year, protests flared up far 
and wide. Encouraged by the level of participation, thousands of lawyers 
observed a general strike on January 6. All courts in Tunisia stopped 
functioning, which showed that state authority itself was being undermined 
(Aljazeera English Online 2011). 
 When faced with these accounts of the role of established organizations, 
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most young cyber-activists and journalists admit that these organizations did 
play a noteworthy role (Amir, Saida et al. interviews 2011). Traditional forms of 
mobilization were important, but NGOs had of course cooperated and 
coordinated successfully with the youth groups and cyber-activists. Small 
groups of human rights activists, intellectuals, illegal political groups and high-
profiled exiles had spent years advocating their own agendas, and jumped onto 
the opportunity for protests when it came. However, it was only the masses and 
the youth that could provide a “body” and critical mass to this political force 
(Saad, interview 2011). 
 Arguably, there was a generational as well as a cultural difference 
between NGO activists and the crowds that thronged the streets. Saad from the 
LTDH pointed out that this was not just a “revolution of the young”. He 
conceded that the LTDH had not been able to recruit any members since 1994 
due to regime constraints, and this indicates that the regime had succeeded in 
alienating the youth from oppositional organizations (Ibid). Conversely, the 
independent associations had not been adept at integrating youth, and hence the 
youth had looked for new spaces to express their own discourses and culture – 
eventually finding such spaces online (Ghorbal 2011).  
 We understand that to listen exclusively to the “Facebook narrative” 
gives us a too narrow understanding of how mobilization took place in Tunisia. 
Despite decades of authoritarianism and corporatism, the country had a strong 
union and a few associations with the capacity to act against the regime. The 
organizational ethos of formal organizations such as the UGTT crystallized the 
shared identity of their members. Their organizational resources and established 
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chains of command (and political weight in the case of the UGTT) accentuated 
their sense of agency, so these variables were greatly strengthened as contention 
developed. And last, but not least, the long and troubled relationship between 
NGOs and the regime itself made it easy to mobilize around shared feelings of 
injustice and a clear picture of whom their antagonist was.  
 The sudden mass movement in Tunisia could therefore rely on a rather 
small, but unified and supportive multi-organizational field (Curtis and Zurcher 
1973, 53). If this multi-organizational field was fragmented before the protests, 
NGOs from across the spectrum merged their efforts when the speed and scale 
of mobilization became apparent. These formal organizations might not have 
initiated the mass movement or encompassed all its participants, for this 
movement far surpassed what the rather small Tunisian NGOs could harness. 
However, they acted in alliance, encouraged sustained protests, and provided 
logistical support. Again, I emphasize that they subsumed their own 
organizational identities under the larger cause of regime change, enabling the 
creation of a “national front” against the regime. 
 To sum up, I appreciate the analysis by interviewee Maha from the 
CNLT (Interview 2011). She stated that three collective actors had come 
together during the December-January rallies:  
• Formal organizations such as the UGTT, which should not be underestimated 
for all the reasons listed above. 
• The new cohort of cyber-activists, whose networks flourished thanks to 
online social media. This was a new phenomenon, and the activists had little 
organization. They either mobilized based on their own grievances, or relayed 
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information from others.  
• “The masses”, which came from all walks of life, and who rallied to the ranks 
of the first two. The momentum of protests, and the emotional impact of 
repression, compelled more and more people to join. To echo Terchek (1974, 
cited in Klandermans 1997, 144), I can conclude that the “indifference 
quotient of the general public” was very low, and further - “the trickle soon 
turned into a torrent” (Kuran 1991). In accordance with Tarrow’s definition of 
cycles of contention, I can add that there was a high rate of both organized 
and unorganized participation (1998, 142). 
 
 We cannot draw clear boundaries between these three collective actors. 
Internet activism, for instance, blurred the distinction between the masses and the 
cyber-activists. A more interesting inference seems to be that online mobilization 
lowered the threshold for mobilization in the streets for everyone. Ultimately, 
however, one was not dependent on Internet access to mobilize: One could rely on, 
and align with, “traditional” civil society activists in the streets.  
 I observe that although Tunisian civil society was largely overlooked as 
potential agents of change before the protests, they were stronger than originally 
thought, or could mobilize dormant resources quickly. The variable strength of civil 
society is essential, and we should not become blinded by the “new social media”-
paradigm in this case. The variables perception of agency and extent of consensus 
mobilization appear to increase in tandem. I prefer to view these two as intervening 
factors, closely related with preceding basic variables such as rates of Internet access 
and strength of civil society. The variable perception of injustice is another 
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fundamental factor, mirrored by its opposite, the question of regime legitimacy12. 
Legitimacy, although a complex notion, is invariably linked to regime practices, and 
it is to these practices and interactions with contenders that we must now turn13
 
. 
 
IV.4 The Response of the Ben Ali Regime 
 
 Contrary to what Sidney Tarrow (1998) purports, repression in Tunisia 
did not have to be moderate or inconsistent to enable people to protest. As I 
have elaborated on previously, the inverse mechanism materialized. Beyond 
repression, however, the regime’s responses were muddled and inconsistent. 
Amir and Mamdouh are among the analysts who observed how the Tunisian 
authorities had no convincing way of dealing with the crisis (Interviews 2011). 
The worst repression was allegedly carried out by the security forces that Ben 
Ali and Trabelsi kept under their personal control, while other agencies acted 
more restrained. For the regime’s part, harsh repression also proved to be a 
mistake. My interviewee Mamdouh made the analogy with the way Chairman 
Mao Zedong and his wife had led the Cultural Revolution in China: When no 
one could check the power of the leading families, the outcome was disastrous 
(Interview 2011). 
 The RCD Party, which had been “holed out” and sidelined by Ben Ali’s 
                                                 
12 In this thesis I have most consistently analyzed the authoritarian bargain as source of regime 
legitimacy. Legitimacy/Injustice is another intermediate factor in our model. . It is interesting to 
consider that President Ben Ali could not base his regime on traditional legitimacy like the 
Moroccan King, and his status as statesman and administrator succumbed to mismanagement and 
stagnation – he therefore had to resort increasingly to repression to assert his authority. 
13 When power is viewed as illegitimate people might withdraw their cooperation from a regime, and 
its power might collapse. This perspective on power was presented by Gene Sharp (1973).  
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fragmentation of the state, was also unable to respond to the crisis. All in all, the 
authorities lacked competent advisors and ideologists who could have devised a 
plan to stem the tide of demands and retake the initiative. The President’s 
concessions came too late and belittled the popular demands, and his speeches 
to the nation only radicalized the protesters (Ibid; Miladi 2011). 
 Already before December 17, there was unease among certain business 
elites and party figures about the regime and its privatization of power. These 
nascent disagreements could have amounted to a small step towards the 
“deepening divisions among elites” that Tarrow classifies as a changing 
political opportunity (1998, 77-80). However, it was not publicly visible, and a 
real elite secession only occurred on the very last days prior to Ben Ali’s flight 
on January 14. It is also interesting to note that one does not observe the other 
dimensions suggested by Tarrow: Political access was not increased before the 
protests, political realignments did not strengthen the protest movement except 
at the level of ordinary people, and influential elites only defected to the 
opposition in the final phase. Political opportunities rather changed because 
ordinary citizens shared a rejectionist discourse, and acquired the networks 
required for action mobilization. One thus understands that Tarrow’s 
dimensions must be complemented with a social constructivist study, to fully 
comprehend how action frames were generated, and how people were 
empowered to rise up against a seemingly monolithic, hegemonic authoritarian 
regime.  
 Mobilization continued unabated during the second week of January, 
even though the regime’s response remained the same: Police brutality. After 
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100,000 people had gathered in Sfax on January 12, Tunisians started realizing 
that the point of no return had been attained. The momentum then spiraled 
upwards again, and the regime was overtaken by events. On January 14, the 
UGTT called a general strike. The country’s leadership was already paralyzed. 
Ben Ali fled the same afternoon, defeated by a movement his intelligence 
apparatus clearly had been unable to foresee (Al Jazeera English Online, 2011).  
 Tarrow (1998, 81) characterizes centralized states with a high capacity 
for policy implementation as “strong states”. The Ben Ali regime prior to 
December 17 2010 appeared relatively strong compared to other Arab states, 
with a seemingly hierarchic power apparatus and quite well developed 
administrative – especially coercive – resources. This offered demonstrators 
with a centralized target. As I have noted, the regime’s strength was twinned 
with its insulation from societal pressures: In Kriesi’s terminology, Ben Ali’s 
state was highly exclusionary (1995, 40-44). In short, the state had become so 
unresponsive to the grievances of Tunisian society, that it was unprepared for 
the crisis. Paradoxically, these regime features amounted to an advantage for 
protesters (see Tarrow 1998, 82). 
 Ben Ali's regime had not grasped how its flawed rule had undermined its 
own power, and I want to highlight that the popular perception of responsibility 
for corruption has emerged as a major variable in my study. As we have seen 
repeatedly, the regime had, in contrast to the Monarchy in Morocco, been 
totally inflexible in its encounters with domestic resistance. Ben Ali relied 
overwhelmingly on force and saw no need to open his political system, not even 
to pre-empt challengers like King Mohamed VI did. A second key independent 
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variable is emerging here, which I associate closely with regime type: Regime 
rigidity/adaptability – the regime's capacity and willingness to compromise 
with or co-opt challenging forces in order to survive. Korany (2012, 
forthcoming) employs the same variable in his analysis of the “Arab Spring” of 
2011. 
 
 
IV.5 The February 20 Movement and mobilization in 
 Morocco 
 
 In Morocco, the processes of mobilization were evidently quite 
different. First, the successful toppling of Ben Ali in Tunisia directly inspired 
protests in Morocco. The Arab uprisings of the spring of 2011 are prime 
examples of transnational diffusion of contentious politics, as Tarrow (1998) 
labels it. Again, the fact that independent media and new social media networks 
are unbound by state boundaries entails that information flows much more 
freely than before, and that ideas, discourses and action frames can be 
appropriated by actors in comparable situations in various locations. This is 
exactly what happened in Morocco. International media conveyed compelling 
images to Moroccans who had access to them. Youths and activists on 
Facebook started discussing whether the country could, and should, experience 
something similar to Egypt’s and Tunisia’s ousting of their leaders a few weeks 
earlier (Selma, interview 2011). It follows from this that the regional precedents 
changed people’s perceptions of what could be done. Here too, their sense of 
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agency was awakened. 
 We immediately observe that Facebook, just like in Tunisia, allowed for 
a decentralized, inclusive, and nationwide discourse among youth and activists. 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the reach of new social media is 
more limited in Morocco than in Tunisia. Generally, the Moroccan population is 
more scattered, less resourceful, and consists in large part of an uneducated 
rural population and urban proletariat (Boukhars 2011, 31). Therefore, online 
mobilization was restricted to those who had access to the technology, and who 
were susceptible to support the cause. It is significant that the first circle of 
people who planned protests in Morocco were activists in the Rabat area with a 
middle-class background (Nizar, Nadia, et al. interviews 2011). 
 Moroccan NGOs did not initiate the protest movement on Facebook. 
Their influence on popular discourse was arguably limited. I have already stated 
that Morocco suffered from multiple economic and social problems in recent 
years just like Tunisia, and interview respondents confirmed that popular 
discourse among many Moroccans was centered on similar economic and social 
grievances, such as unemployment and the rising cost of living. Selma, a 
member of the February 20 protest Movement, confirmed that people had been 
complaining, but that they had been doing it informally, and mostly among 
families and friends (Interview 2011). “Bread riots”, strikes, and other forms of 
contentious politics had occurred across the country for years, with a wave of 
unrest peaking after the financial crisis (Paciello 2010, 94). These were 
symptoms of a widespread political malaise in Morocco, although the targets of 
contention were probably not defined as unequivocally as in Tunisia. 
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Nevertheless, the perception of injustice was strong enough to unclench waves 
of protests. Due to the less repressive circumstances in Morocco, oppositional 
discourses could be nurtured more openly, but I shall elaborate on why these 
discourses turned out to be less potent than their Tunisian counterparts. 
The legitimacy of the Moroccan political system has been dropping 
during recent years. Significant strata of the Moroccan population had arguably 
lost patience with corrupt and inept politicians and weak parliamentarians and 
ministers, who were unable to solve the country’s pressing problems. This 
national mood spurred several Moroccans to follow events in Tunisia and Egypt 
closely, and individuals to start Facebook groups such as “Democracy Now” 
and “Moroccans who want dialogue with the King” (Nizar, interview 2011). 
The regime's concessions in the 1990s and early 2000s had not been sufficient 
to assuage the grievances of those who had lost out from flawed reforms. 
Liberalism had undercut state-run programs and affected vulnerable businesses, 
without creating promised economic growth. 
 Thus far, the Moroccan situation resembled Tunisia in several ways. The 
discourses were oftentimes the same, although people had more experience with 
open contention in Morocco. As I have mentioned, the country had seen its 
political opportunity structure change in formal terms since the 1990s, notably 
with easier political access for the citizenry by means of elections and the right 
to organize political rallies. Anyways, I have noted previously that these 
reforms had entailed little de facto improvements in popular influence on 
decision-making (Boukhars 2011). 
 One major difference between Tunisia and Morocco was of course the 
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conditions under which civil society could operate. Moroccan NGOs had 
experienced attempts at co-optation, divide-and-rule, and infiltration by the 
Makhzen, but in general they were considerably less constrained than civil 
society in Tunisia. Interestingly, adherents to the February 20 Movement had 
divergent interpretations of the roles various NGOs had played in the 
Movement’s founding and operation. As in Tunisia, some interview respondents 
argued consistently that the protest movement had emerged from communities 
set up online, first and foremost on Facebook. The information they had shared 
online had permitted the creation of collective action frames inspired by Tunis 
and Cairo. These online discourses had been compelling enough to inspire 
people to proceed to planning street action. Notably, the first members of the 
February 20 group online set up a manifesto, and then permitted people to 
discuss freely what they wanted to omit or include in the network’s charter and 
list of demands. The end result was a set of political, social, economic, human 
rights, and cultural (Amazigh) demands (Selma, interview 2011).  
 The founders of the February 20 Movement did not vet the list of 
participants in any way and their contributions were extremely eclectic, so 
consensus could only be built around a “lowest common denominator” of 
demands. Selma, Nizar, Amin and other February 20 Movement members all 
recounted how the first small group of activists had made a video where they 
explained why they wanted to protest, and posted this video online. The video 
was credited as a huge success, arguably illustrating that such simple tools were 
sufficient to coordinate a mass movement (Interviews 2011). 
 Just as in Tunisia, the narrative about “spontaneous” protests 
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coordinated online is a forceful one, and it reflects the perceptions activists have 
of themselves as independent from narrow sectorial interests, political parties, 
or formal NGOs. Most of these latter actors have a tainted image in Moroccan 
political imagery, whereas engaged youth want to represent a new political 
force. Interview respondents were quick to note that the February 20 Movement 
was “the first of its kind in Morocco” (Nizar, interview 2011).  
 Mobilization did not just occur simultaneously among all aggrieved 
people, although the activists’ discourse frequently resorts to this image. Some 
individuals dared join protest networks before others. Just like in Tunisia, these 
founding members of the Movement gained status as symbols, even though 
they were not formal leaders. As the number of adherents to the Movement 
grew, mobilization became self-reinforcing. This mobilization by example was 
much easier to accomplish than in Tunisia, because activists did not have to fear 
regime censorship of their online activities or police arrests, although a few 
such episodes did occur (Nadia, Transparency Maroc, interviews 2011). 
Mobilization in Morocco was then more a question of awareness-raising and 
convincing people that participation could yield benefits.  
 However, I am not arguing that the question of “fear” and repression 
was not an obstacle to mobilization in Morocco. According to several activists, 
many Moroccans still remember the years of repression - les années de plomb - 
under former King Hassan II. Heavy Makhzen surveillance, the use of secret 
prisons, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment of activists, torture, and widespread 
use of force against rioters are but a few of the vivid memories Moroccans still 
have from the 1970s and 1980s (Nadia, interview 2011). Despite an apparent 
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modernization and liberalization, the regime’s agents are still omnipresent at all 
levels of society.  Nizar of the February 20 Movement explained that there were 
still “reflexes of restraint” among many, who were therefore reluctant to join the 
mass protests (Interview 2011). Selma agreed, stating that people still live under 
a collective imagery of servitude to the King (Interview 2011). The February 20 
Movement wanted to address this fear, and conversely to empower people to 
advance their claims.  
 All in all, the conditions were much more permitting for protests in 
Morocco than in Tunisia, and an answer to the question of why the degree of 
contention in Morocco will probably rather be found in the questions of 
perceived injustice and agency, civil society strength, and regime flexibility. 
 
 
IV.4.1 The decisive role of formal organizations in Morocco 
  
 Online social media were indeed a catalyst for protests in Morocco, but 
civil society also entered the movement at an early stage. Human rights 
organizations in Rabat had been holding sit-ins in sympathy with Tunisia, Egypt 
and Libya during the winter of 2011, and there had been committees of support 
with Tunisia operating for years. Interviews with activists revealed that almost 
all of them had previous connections to the cluster of autonomous human rights 
organizations in Rabat: Amnesty International, the AMDH, and Transparency 
Maroc, to mention some. It was clear that several organizations, and the AMDH 
in particular, wanted to assume a leading role in the protest movement from the 
100 
 
start (Abdallah, Amin, et al., interviews 2011). 
  Amin, a member of the youth club of the AMDH, underlined that the 
Moroccan NGO sector had struggled to recruit youth to its organizations. He 
argued that the AMDH had been more successful at this precisely because it 
challenged the preconceptions many young people had of NGO activism as 
“participation in endless meetings and noisy assemblies” (Interview 2011). In 
his view, most NGOs only managed to recruit those who were already 
interested in volunteering, while the AMDH was better at reaching out to new 
constituencies and generations. Even though conditions for civil society 
organizations in Morocco were better than in Tunisia, the cultural and 
generational differences that I discern between long-running NGO activists and 
youth remind us of the situation in the latter country. 
Interestingly, older Moroccan NGO activists expressed surprise at the 
level of commitment their youth members showed to the emerging protest 
movement. Furthermore, generational cleavages manifested themselves in 
debates on strategy. The youth were more impatient and wanted to replicate the 
dramatic, yet successful examples of Tunis and Cairo, while “the old guard” 
held back and opted for a moderate approach (Abdallah, interview 2011). 
Undoubtedly, activists were anxious about how the regime would respond to 
such unprecedented mobilization.  
 While certain activists worked independently of formal NGOs and only 
expressed their views online, activist youth belonging either to the AMDH or 
the plethora of radical Leftist groups, trade unions, etc. in Morocco were also 
active users of new social media. This meant that the distinction between online 
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organization and “non-cyber” organization of protests was even more blurred 
than in Tunisia.  
 Regardless of who shaped the agenda, the February 20 Movement 
benefited from being portrayed as a genuine youth initiative rather than a 
“product” of the activities of mainstream NGOs. The AMDH itself was careful 
to underline the Movement’s autonomy and grass-roots character (Ibid). I 
interpret this narrative as an integral part of the Movement’s identity, but the 
responses of interviewees betray a consistent civil society involvement and 
influence.  
 Amin and Nadia described how civil society activists gathered to form 
the first coordination cell of the February 20 Movement (Interviews 2011). 
Organizations such as the AMDH had chapters in more than 90 Moroccan 
cities, and encouraged these to set up February 20 coalitions around the country. 
From the start, experienced activists from established associations formed the 
“practical core” of the Movement, and ensured that its momentum was not lost. 
The demonstrations on February 20 were therefore planned and announced 
weeks in advance, and Amin recalled how young members of the AMDH had 
worked day and night to mobilize people leading up to this crucial day 
(Interview 2011). The long-established friendships and networks among these 
individuals greatly facilitated their joint efforts at pooling their resources 
together and preparing for the events. 
 Activists received substantial logistical support from their primary 
organizations, 99 of which established a National Council of Support to the 
February 20 Movement. Included were several trade unions, but these did not 
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have an influence or capacity comparable to that of the UGTT in Tunisia. 
Abdallah, himself leader of a local chapter of the Union Marocaine du Travail 
(UMT), elaborated on how the Makhzen had successfully splintered and 
weakened the Moroccan trade union movement over decades, and that 
membership was very low compared to that of the UGTT. The Moroccan 
regime had implemented legislation that undermined the power of union 
delegates at the workplace, and several unions were too closely associated with 
political parties to be credible representatives of workers’ interests.  
 Civil society actors argued that their involvement in the Movement 
helped mobilization greatly. Traditional mobilization with flyers, posters, and 
outreach activities were relatively more important than in Tunisia, because of 
the limited reach of Facebook and Moroccan printed media. Television and 
radio, which remain under regime control, were not mentioning the Movement 
before the first mass rallies; while some minor newspapers were acknowledging 
its existence and potential. Still, the large numbers of illiterate people could 
only be reached if civil society and trade unions put their resources at the 
Movement’s disposal. Hence, the Movement’s online activity was 
complemented by the efforts of multiple organizations, and their role increased 
over time in an effort to keep up the politicization of sympathetic groups. This 
effort arguably became more important as protests dragged on throughout the 
spring and summer months of 2011. 
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IV.4.2 Challenges to widespread mobilization in Morocco  
  
 To further understand the important role of formal organizations for the 
February 20 Movement, one can employ Curtis and Zurcher’s concept of multi-
organizational fields (1973, 53). In contrast to Tunisia, where the multi-
organizational field was small, but well consolidated, the Moroccan field of 
formal organizations has been broader and more polarized. Oppositional 
organizations ranging from the radical Left to the Islamists have constituted 
rival alliances vying for influence over the February 20 Movement. Interview 
respondents affirmed that the Movement remained open to anyone interested. 
The Leftists and Islamists had a notable capability to bring their followers out in 
massive numbers, and were therefore important components of the Movement. 
Abdallah rendered how the first core of activists had decided to open the 
Movement to everyone, to prevent any subsequent strife between factions in the 
streets (Interview 2011). However, the Movement’s spokespersons have 
adamantly denied that extremists control them in any organizational sense, and 
have pointed out that this is only an allegation the Makhzen has been spreading 
to delegitimize the February 20 Movement. 
 Amin, and other human rights activists who had been involved from the 
start, emphasized their personal loyalty to the founding charter of the February 
20 Movement, and argued that they had been able to hold the political “center” 
free from the interference of either Leftists or Islamists. Both of these “ends of 
the political spectrum” ran their own popular initiatives, and could operate 
independently from the Movement if they so wanted (Interviews 2011). Thus, 
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the February 20 Movement did not monopolize the socio-political space for 
protests in Morocco. One may derive from this discussion that the Moroccan 
protest movement was struggling much more than the Tunisian one to forge a 
strong sense of unity and shared identity.  
 In Tunisia, the escalation of protests had been so rapid that there had 
been little time to debate strategies, and various political forces were united in a 
popular front against the regime. Moreover, formal organizations had not 
“unleashed” the unrest in Tunisia, and had been unable to impose any pre-
existing identity or agenda on it. Although the Tunisian organizational field was 
generally weak, the weight of the UGTT ensured that a massive mobilization 
could be undertaken through “traditional” channels and with participants from 
various age cohorts. The Moroccan organizations clearly lacked the leadership 
of a predominant organization like the UGTT which could have kept discipline 
at crucial junctures. Moroccan trade unions could not uphold this role. The 
AMDH spearheaded the February 20 Movement, but it was still not a mass 
organization, and it drew its core members from a limited socioeconomic 
stratum. The infighting of NGOs in Morocco weakened them collectively and 
undercut their legitimacy in the eyes of non-members. In sum, Morocco scores 
lower than expected on civil society strength, because this variable is not only 
about the freedom of civil society, but also about the ability of organizations to 
use their freedom and acting cohesively. 
 In its first phase, the February 20 Movement had been hastily built 
around a set of shared demands, with a basic shared identity related to these 
demands. The Movement’s identity and goals might actually vanish if people 
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were forced to choose between the identity of the Movement and the competing 
identities of its constituent groups, and this debate arose as the Moroccan 
demonstrations became drawn out in time. The February 20 Movement has 
managed this tension so far, both because the Movement’s Founding Charter 
echoes the grievances participants had before February 20, and which they still 
have, and supposedly because the Movement’s identity is malleable. Activists in 
Rabat conceded that starting from mid-May 2011, they had shifted their 
discourse somewhat from political to social demands, in order to activate the 
untapped potential of the poorest classes and forestall a weakening of the 
Movement (Amin, Selma, Nadia, interviews 2011).  
 Some went as far as claiming that the Movement’s initial focus on 
politics, and in particular constitutional reform, had been a mistake. This 
discourse had mostly appealed to the middle classes, whereas the poor in les 
quartiers populaires were indifferent:  
 
 “People in the poorer districts are only interested in bread, olive oil, 
 and so on. They don’t know what parliamentary democracy is, they are 
 illiterate and they don’t care. If you talk about these things, you will not 
 trigger their interest” (Amin, interview 2011). 
 
 
 Some interview respondents argued, like in Tunisia, that socio-economic 
and political demands could not really be extricated from each other, and that 
Moroccans from all walks of life had participated at the first demonstrations, 
which had taken place in more than 35 cities (Nizar, interview 2011). However, 
the February 20 Movement had clearly not been able to attain a critical mass. It 
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appears as if the multi-organizational field which helped drive mobilization in 
Morocco was quite divided according to class tiers and that the first waves of 
protests had not reached beyond the professional and middle classes to a 
sufficient extent, at least not in the capital. In Casablanca, on the other hand, 
mobilization among the poor had been a Movement goal from the outset 
(Selma, interview 2011).  
 This new drive in the poorer quarters entailed a shift in focus, meaning 
that local and communal issues gained more prominence at the expense of 
direct demands for political reform at the central level. The regime probably 
welcomed this change, but it was also worried about the possible growth of 
demonstrations when the poor joined them. The new strategy also meant that 
the moderate Islamists gained greater influence over the February 20 
Movement. The Islamists had always been popular among the poor, who felt 
alienated by the modernizing rhetoric of the government and left out by the neo-
liberal state. The Islamists were useful to the February 20 Movement, because 
their cadres were well disciplined, and they could provide a sizable pool of 
rank-and-file in order to throng the streets and add significance to the 
contention (Amin, interview 2011). Abdallah estimated the current number of 
protesters each weekend to hover around 300,000, but he believed that the 
numbers had to reach the millions for the regime to yield further concessions 
(Interview 2011). The largest single rally in the spring had probably never 
exceeded 80,000 people (Nizar, interview 2011). Obviously, the scale of this 
protest movement never equaled that of the mass demonstrations in Tunisia. 
 This basic fact, and the understanding that the continued efforts of 
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multiple NGOs was required to sustain mobilization throughout the spring, 
compels us to ask whether the mobilization potential in Morocco had actually 
been relatively limited from the beginning. The narratives about grievances and 
injustice that fueled participation might have been less suggestive, and less 
emotionally charged, than their Tunisian counterparts. While a large number of 
Tunisians felt collectively humiliated by the oppressive state and socio-
economic pressures, Moroccans mobilized along class lines, and a lot of them 
apparently lacked a refined understanding of the more political aspects of 
demands. In Tunisia, again, people across the country had a very clear 
perception of the corruption at the top, which fueled an unprecedented anger. 
 The political agenda of the Moroccan protesters was limited to 
demanding constitutional reforms and improvements in governance and 
transparency. This is a total contrast to Tunisia, where the crowds clamored for 
the outright overturning of the regime itself. Theirs was a clear-cut, spectacular 
demand that stirred people’s emotions and shared feeling of “making history”. 
Their revolutionary demands stand in clear contrast to the reformist movement 
in Morocco. I want to foreground that the February 20 Movement was very 
careful when criticizing the King. As I have presented previously, the King 
benefits enormously from a propaganda and traditional imagery that elevates 
his person above the failings of the Moroccan regime. The February 20 
Movement went further than anyone before it in holding the King accountable, 
but they could not have demanded his removal for fear of losing popular 
support. This difference on the variable radicalism of protesters' demands is a 
fundamental input to the question of why contention was so much less intense 
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in Morocco. 
 The fact that the Makhzen’s coercive apparatus appears less intrusive in 
people’s lives than Ben Ali’s security forces were to Tunisians, and that overt 
repression is rarely seen in Morocco, also prevented Moroccans from acquiring 
the same urgent need to change political conditions in the country. In spite of 
towering economic and social problems, the sense of injustice has been less 
heightened and people have felt less desperate to act.  
 If one makes a comparison in terms of socio-economic grievances only, 
the mobilization potential in Morocco could have been comparable to that of 
Tunisia. Transparency Maroc explained that “the social and economic 
grievances in Morocco are the same as in other Arab countries, but the political 
regime is different, so the outcome must be different” (Interview 2011). The 
reason for why protests have been more modest in Morocco might lie as much 
with the regime as with society. It is to the political regime that I now turn. 
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IV.4.3 Interactions between protesters and the Moroccan regime 
 
 Until the mass protests started to stir up the popular districts in the late 
spring of 2011, the Moroccan state did not respond with much repression. The 
Makhzen was careful to strike only when the media was absent, and repression 
was harsher in more remote locations. Nevertheless, the Moroccan regime was 
surely worried about protests from the start, and turned to its preferred methods 
of co-optation and pre-emption to take the steam out of this emerging political 
force. From the first weeks of February, the Makhzen even used Facebook and 
its own media outlets to spread disinformation against activists. The regime 
already had a tormented relationship with several of the core NGOs backing the 
February 20 Movement, most notably the AMDH.  
 One of the founding members of the Movement online appeared on 
television on February 19, saying that the anticipated protests had been called 
off. Other activists immediately refuted this claim, and accused the Makhzen of 
bribing people into acquiescence (Nadia, interview 2011). An expedient use of 
Facebook and traditional mobilization led to a very successful turnout the 
following day. The organizers themselves were surprised at their success, and 
the rallies that day made for a paradigmatic event in Moroccan politics. 
Marches were not met with police violence, but sit-ins over the following days 
were dispersed. The police also used indiscriminate violence when the 
protesters organized a small sit-in in May at Tamara, where the Moroccan secret 
police is suspected of running a prison (Selma, interview 2011). Furthermore, 
the February 20 Movement had recurrent troubles with thugs who called 
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themselves “royalists”, who interfered at their rallies, and who had allegedly 
been paid by the Makhzen. The police also protected the “royalists”. However, 
serious clashes did not erupt between them and anti-regime protesters. 
 Largely, repression was mild, with few people killed (New York Times 
Online 2011). This means that fear was a minor obstacle to participation, and 
conversely, that repression did not engender outrage and the ensuing escalation 
of protests like it did in Tunisia.  
 
Table III: Estimates of Casualties in Tunisia and Morocco 201114
Country 
 
Numbers 
Tunisia 219 
Morocco 2 
 
 
 While escalation of contention in Tunisia was very swift, and the regime 
was unable to get ahead of the developments, the Moroccan regime had a 
greater opportunity to respond to the Movement’s demands. The Monarchy and 
the Makhzen might also have learned from the mistakes that Ben Ali and 
Mubarak had committed. On March 9, the King gave a speech where he 
declared that a constitutional reform would take place, the minimum wage 
would be increased, and other token social reforms carried out (Abdallah, 
interview 2011).  
 Thus, King Mohamed VI regained the initiative in the political process 
                                                 
14 Sources: BBC News Africa 2011. Tunisia Protests left 200 dead says UN. Online, URL: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12335692 (accessed January 26, 2012) Estimate derived 
from UN probes. Morocco source:  Tel Quel (484) July 30.  
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merely a few weeks after the protests had begun. He was to appoint who would 
revise the constitution and how this process would be organized, and he was to 
have decisive influence over the final draft. Nevertheless, people responded 
with enthusiasm, and claimed that the King had granted them their “Arab 
Spring” without violence. This meant that the mass protests lost a lot of their 
less dedicated followers. The King’s plan effectively undermined the legitimacy 
of the February 20 Movement. The women’s association, l’Association 
Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines (ADFM), went so far as to say that the 
Movement had lost its very core (Interview 2011). This was arguably not the 
case, but the King had successfully appropriated the Movement’s own discourse 
to preserve his own hegemony. Nadia deplored: “When the King says he wants 
to address poverty, and we also want to address poverty, this creates ambiguity 
among people. Who are they going to believe?” (Interview 2011). One after 
another, Moroccan NGOs were confronted with the choice of boycotting the 
reforms, or bandwagon with the King’s initiative. Almost all chose the last 
option.  
Mobilization in itself is exhaustive and requires heavy involvement and 
commitment by participants and organizations. A true popular movement can 
rarely be sustained over time (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In Morocco, the 
popular perception of injustice was simply not emotionally intense enough to 
nurture prolonged levels of contention, and the numbers receded through the 
spring of 2011. Dwindling support arguably affects the perception of agency 
among less committed participants, and demobilization becomes a self-
reinforcing phenomenon. In Tunisia, the opposite mechanism occurred as we 
112 
 
have seen, and demobilization only took place after Ben Ali had stepped down. 
 To continue with the Monarchy’s strategy in early 2011, I underline that 
the constitutional drafting process lacked transparency and the final constitution 
lacked in clarity and consistency. Still, many NGOs praised the new provisions 
and hoped they would entail real improvements. Transparency Maroc argued 
that the new draft opened for new anti-corruption legislation. The Union of 
Journalists perceived possibilities for improving the Press Code. They also 
viewed the threshold on critiquing the King as somewhat lowered15
 The Moroccan regime has succeeded where Ben Ali failed – by creating 
a counter-discourse to the protest movement, and dividing the Moroccan people 
accordingly. Interestingly, the more integrative mode of governance in Morocco 
might have given the regime an advantage when dealing with protests
. 
 However, the Constitution that was approved by popular referendum on 
July 1, 2011 does not safeguard present gains in terms of fundamental civic and 
political rights from future threats. Reforms in Morocco remain precarious, 
because the Makhzen typically prefers to rule by means of ambiguity, nepotism, 
and traditionalism rather than codified laws (Sater 2007; Younes M’Jahid, 
interview 2011). The new Constitution has achieved little in terms of improving 
predictability in governance or equality before the law, even though popular 
optimism continues unabated.  
16
                                                 
15  Normally, the King's person, the Islamic faith, and the Army, are institutions that are 
protected from public debate by the so-called “red lines”. Journalists who transgress them are 
punished, but the Union of Journalists conceded that these red lines fluctuate with the political 
climate in the country. Around the time of approving the constitution, they had been scaled 
back, and some criticism of the Monarchy was even permitted. However, the unpredictable 
degree of censorship is precisely a tool for Makhzen to keep Moroccan media disciplined – they 
can never know when and how the authorities will react (Younes M'Jahid, interview 2011). 
. In 
16 King Mohamed VI's multi-centered state might have seemed “weaker” than Ben Ali's 
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addition, the ambiguous governance structures of the Monarchy, the 
superficially modern institutions of Parliament and courts, and the Makhzen that 
permeates the entire structure, make for a difficult protest target17
 This discussion has shown that there were fundamental differences 
between how the Tunisian and Moroccan regimes interacted with challengers 
during the spring of 2011, and that their behavior reflects their more long-
standing approaches to oppositional political forces. With reference to the 
regime rigidity/adaptability variable I applied in the case of Tunisia, I conclude 
that Morocco is situated much more towards the flexible/integrative end of the 
spectrum and has been for a long time, and that this can explain why that 
country only saw the emergence of a reformist movement with limited goals 
which also only gained fewer supporters and had a smaller impact on the 
. Selma 
reflected on this, saying “people don’t know to whom, or how, to address their 
grievances” (Interview 2011). One understands immediately that the 
“perception of injustice”-factor suffered from such a lack of an easily 
identifiable antagonist: Corruption and mismanagement were systemic and 
severe, but they were not associated with the Head of State like they had been 
so expressively in Tunisia. This difference also informed people’s notion of 
agency in each country differently. 
                                                                                                                                          
monolithic, insulated autocracy, if one compares them according to Tarrow's criteria of 
centralization and implementation capacity (1998, 82). I am not arguing that the Moroccan state 
is decentralized in the meaning of “federal”, for its core remains authoritarian. However, it 
covers a larger and more diverse population, and encompasses a wider set of economic, social 
(17 continued): and political interests, among which the King is the arbiter, as we have seen.  
17  One must not exaggerate the usefulness of applying the dichotomies centralized-
fragmented and exclusive-inclusive when one analyzes authoritarian states. The Tunisian state 
proved more fragmented than expected, while the study has shown how the various Moroccan 
institutions are sown together by the organic and personalistic bonds of the Makhzen. With these 
caveats in mind I contend that we may still undertake a comparison based on these dimensions. 
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regime than did contention in Tunisia. 
Lastly, if one looks for Tarrow’s other political opportunity structures in 
the case of Morocco, we see that most of them had not, and did not, materialize 
during the spring of 2011. Emboldened by the examples of their neighboring 
countries, people have expressed their grievances in unprecedented numbers, 
and they have managed to collaborate nationwide like they had never done 
before. Yet regardless of how pressured the regime felt, contention could not 
fracture it. Elites did not defect to the protesters, and the Moroccan regime 
remained as pluralistic and flexible, yet as loyal to its leader, as it had always 
been. 
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V - Conclusion 
 Our examination and comparison of contentious episodes in Tunisia and 
Morocco shows that most of the independent variables I suggested from the 
outset were relevant, but that others detected under way were also significant 
when explaining differences between the cases. The study supports my 
argument that one needs to apply a social constructivist approach to identify 
how structural, long-term socio-economic and political changes could help spur 
collective action. Despite the decline of the authoritarian corporatist order, I 
have observed that both the Tunisian and Moroccan regimes were quite adept at 
retaining control of their respective societies, albeit in different ways. If I 
restrict the analysis to the political opportunity structures in these countries, I 
cannot explain the sudden wave of unrest that emerged in both polities. 
However, by bringing in an exploration of the collective action frames that were 
generated, and how these affected people’s interpretations of injustice, identity, 
and agency, one acquires the tools to understand how this “flash flood” could 
occur. The impact of purely economic grievances might also have been less 
than I hypothesized.  
Indeed, Tunisia and Morocco shared many of the same problems, 
resulting from flawed processes of neo-liberal restructuring and a retreat of the 
public sector. The demographic boom only exacerbated rising unemployment 
figures, while cuts in subsidies led to rising expenses. At the same time, these 
countries had vastly expanded their educational systems. The consequence was 
that a huge number of students graduated every year with high aspirations, 
which the economic and political order could not fulfill.  
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 The level of economic development and class configurations were quite 
different in the two countries, however, with Tunisia having a more advanced 
economy and a much larger literate educated middle class than Morocco. This 
affected the scope of mobilization. Morocco’s poorer classes were slower to 
respond to the call for mobilization, and the February 20 Movement has had to 
alter its demands somewhat to appeal to the country’s lower strata. In Tunisia, 
the middle class, and the highly educated unemployed, had experienced the Ben 
Ali regime as a collective humiliation, and rallied behind a fundamental, 
emotionally charged demand for the restoration of dignity.  
The anger against the Ben Ali regime was directed at two levels – 1) the 
abusive and dehumanizing practices of security forces and regime agents, which 
were everywhere in society, and which interfered in all civil, social, cultural, 
educational, and political life in the country – and 2) against the President and 
his closest coterie of family and advisors, who seemed corrupt beyond repair. 
 The latter aspect is such a central factor to explain mobilization that I 
prefer to single out popular perceptions of responsibility for corruption as a 
major variable in my model. The Tunisian public had good opportunities to 
observe how the ruling family ran the state as its own private enterprise, 
 In Morocco, the regime’s internal diversification between the Monarchy 
and the Parliament and Government meant that the public was less prone to 
keep the King personally responsible for problems identified at the lower rungs 
of the administration. Moreover, the Moroccan King and his closest technocrats 
managed to appear much more responsive to the problem of corruption.  
In general, the Moroccan state seems less insulated from society than 
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Ben Ali’s regime was. The Tunisian state either knew that its legitimacy was 
declining, but remained confident it could handle unrest with coercion like it 
did in Gafsa, or the regime was too preoccupied with depressing organizational 
life and imposing conformity on society to see the warning signs. The 
Moroccan state, on the other hand, had gained experience with responding to, 
and co-opting popular demands, and maneuvered to counter the February 20 
Movement by adopting the latter’s own discourse. Morocco had gone through 
an easing of repression and the installation of new channels for popular claims-
making such as election campaigns and a freer civil society. All these reforms 
were heavily flawed, but they created valves which relieve most pressures 
against the regime structure. 
This ability to adapt to new forms of opposition, to new discourses and 
even social media indicate that the Moroccan regime is flexible without 
reneging power or democratizing. The variable regime adaptability might be the 
single most significant factor detected in this comparative study. I argue further 
that regime adaptability must be assessed over time, because a regime that 
engages with challengers over time is more likely to pre-empt their demands 
and prevent future radical contention, than a harshly repressive authoritarian 
state which proves more “brittle” in the face of popular attacks. One must be 
cautious no to equate regime flexibility “reform-willingness”: Most 
authoritarian states reform only under pressure and political liberalization is 
often more rhetoric than reality. Thence my focus on how the Moroccan 
government has reinvented its hegemony over the last two decades. Lastly, the 
Moroccan regime never made the same promises of social and economic justice 
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that the Tunisians were accustomed to, so expectations of what the state would 
deliver were always lower. 
 Our comparative study has shown in general that most of the political 
opportunity dimensions that Tarrow’s model encourages us to look for were 
absent in our two cases. However, the introduction of new communication 
technologies and unprecedented media connectivity has heralded a new era for 
organization and mobilization, and this is also true for authoritarian settings. 
One must keep in mind that access to such information resources was skewed 
along socio-economic class lines, a fact that affected the possibility of 
awareness-raising more in poorer, decentralized Morocco than it did in 
urbanized middle-class Tunisia. But, in general, the advent of Facebook has 
greatly facilitated access to new communities and the sharing of discourses in 
all countries. 
 In this way, the many contingent, localized discourses of alienation, 
resentment and resistance found a new space where they could merge into a 
larger collective action frame against the political status quo. Facebook helped 
collapse constraints of distance and time, and made coordination decentralized, 
simultaneous, and almost effortless. Crucially, new social media enabled new 
forms of “citizen journalism”, evading regime censorship and raising awareness 
among new groups. All in all, a lot of the obstacles for participation were 
greatly diminished. For instance, the knowledge that more and more people 
committed to join demonstrations removed some of the collective action 
problems that might otherwise incur under informal, non-hierarchical and 
spontaneous mobilization – in short, agency was enhanced. Consensus 
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mobilization, action mobilization, the sharing of strongly moving images and 
testimonies all happened at the same time for many, and their pace only 
accelerated: One can only separate them for analytical clarity.  
 Furthermore, our studies have confirmed that traditional mobilization 
organized by formal unions and associations played a key role for realizing 
successful and sustained mobilization. In Tunisia, where few autonomous 
organizations existed, the UGTT became the backbone of a re-energized civil 
society. In Morocco, civil society played a vital role in planning protests in 
advance, and it was effectively NGO youth which used social media to augment 
the mobilization potential. I have also seen that organizations in Tunisia were 
more coherent in their actions than the Moroccan NGOs, and that this had 
repercussions for the unity and influence of the protest movement. The friction 
within the Moroccan NGO field had time to emerge because mobilization was 
drawn-out and its momentum relatively low, while in Tunisia NGOs did not 
have a choice but to bandwagon with, and pool their resources with, the popular 
movement that had burst forth. The variable strength of civil society is more 
significant than one might have expected given the “Western” media’s one-
sided focus on Internet-driven mobilization. I have also suggested that these 
factors are interrelated in complex ways, and I will not attempt to make a 
graphic model except for summing up my findings in Table VI. Some of these 
factors are arguably independent and precedes all others, while factors such as 
perceptions of legitimacy/injustice and agency are informed by more structural 
factors such as regime type, civil society, and class and education levels.  
Interestingly, many of the factors which I have highlighted as 
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contrasting my cases are of a rather structural nature, such as regime 
type/adaptability. Economic grievances were comparable, but protesters 
challenged different modes of governance with unequal intensity.  
Factors such as consensus mobilization, feeling of injustice and agency 
(where I find more commonalities) are of a more discursive and intersubjective 
nature. This supports my claim that oppositional discourses, shared action 
frames and similar mechanisms might arise independently of structural 
backgrounds, although structural broader state-society relations will affect the 
outcome of such contention. This study has maybe more than anything shown 
that contention is very difficult to predict, because compelling oppositional 
discourses can arise even under the harshest circumstances – Syria is another 
recent example of this. In particular, the groundbreaking advent of new social 
media has empowered activists in innovative ways in relation to their 
authoritarian masters.  
 I will sum up by presenting how the two cases scored on each of my 
variables in a table (see page 120). Lastly, the interplay of forces examined here 
deserves further study, and constitutes a fascinating research agenda for 
developing new analysis of contentious politics. To succeed, authors must look 
both at the macro- and the micro levels, and of course factor in human agency. 
Human agency is the decisive variable which will always make contention 
impossible to predict, but still unleashes it when it happens. No social science 
model can explain or predict all collective action scenarios, but the eclectic and 
flexible nature of the modern sub-field leaves it with a good prospect for 
improving its models and theories even further. 
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Table IV: Overview of Structural and Discursive Variables for Tunisia and 
Morocco18
Variable / Country 
 
Tunisia  Morocco 
Economic liberalization Highly liberalized 
Liberalized, but 
national economy less 
modernized and 
integrated 
Political liberalization Not liberalized Limited reforms implemented 
Literacy and education 
levels 
High levels of 
literacy and 
education 
Relatively low for the 
region 
Civil society strength 
Weak, but strong 
monopoly trade 
union 
Few constraints on 
activity but relatively 
small and fragmented 
Regime 
type/adaptability 
Authoritarian 
and unwilling to 
reform 
Semi-authoritarian, 
demonstrating 
adaptability 
Popular perception on 
corruption 
Corruption seen 
as emanating 
from ruling 
family 
Corruption seen as 
endemic but not 
associated with Head 
of State 
Perception on 
legitimacy/injustice 
Regime 
perceived as 
highly 
illegitimate 
Regime legitimacy in 
slow decline 
Extent of consensus 
mobilization 
Widespread 
consensus 
Consensus on 
grievances divided 
along class and 
education lines 
Perception of agency 
Widely shared 
and increasing 
notion of agency 
Relatively strong in 
February 2011 but 
declining since then 
Speed of mobilization Very rapid, spontaneous Gradual 
Magnitude of contention Very large Limited 
Radicalism of protesters’ 
demands 
Revolutionary – 
demanding 
regime change 
Reformist – political 
and social demands 
but not regime 
change 
 
                                                 
18  We saw previously that Internet access rates did not vary much across the cases. 
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VII  - Annex I: Interview Participants 
 
Abdallah – Senior member of the AMDH and UMT trade union in Rabat 
 
ADFM – interview held with several members of the Marrakech branch 
 
Ahmed – youth street activist and student, from Nabeul, Tunisia 
 
Amin – Youth activist and member of the February 20th Movement, Rabat 
 
Amira – Journalist and human rights activist, Tunis 
 
Amir – Journalist and human rights activist, Tunis 
 
Maha – activist of the Conseil National des Libertés en Tunisie (CNLT) 
 
Mamdouh – NGO chairman and experienced pro-democracy activist in Tunis 
 
Marwa, online activist and journalist, Tunis 
 
Nadia – Youth Coordinator at the Association marocaine des droits de l'homme, 
 Rabat 
 
Nizar – Youth activist and member of the February 20th Movement, Rabat 
 
Ramzi – radio journalist, Tunis 
 
Reem – Youth activist, especially active online (Facebook) in Tunis 
 
Saad – senior member of the Ligue Tunisienne pour les Droits de l'homme 
 
Saida – Journalist, blogger and activist, Tunis 
 
Selma – Youth activist, spokeswoman for the February 20th Movement, Rabat 
 
Transparency Maroc -  interview with senior member, Rabat 
 
UGTT Sousse – Interview with senior ranking members.  
 
Younes M'Jahid – Secretary General of the Moroccan Journalists' Union, Rabat 
 
Zekry – Senior member of the Tunisian Bar Association, Tunis 
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Annex II: Informed Consent Interviews 
 
 
The American University in Cairo, Egypt. Summer 2011. 
Informed Consent Form 
 
 
Principal Investigator: Johan Rognlie Roko 
 
 
Purpose: The purpose of the study is to provide the researcher, a graduate student 
doing his thesis in the American University in Cairo, with information about how it 
was possible for activists to mobilize so many people in Tunisia and Morocco during 
the recent protests.  
 
 
Procedures: The project relies on interviews with activists. The topics will include: 
What sort of ideas and views about the regime were shared among people prior to 
protests, how widespread were these perceptions and how did they spread, what role 
did the mass media and web sites play for mobilization, in what ways were the 
shared ideas of alienation and disillusionment changed into an idea about active 
participation and mobilization? 
 
 
Risks: You are asked to assess your own risks carefully. Do you think you run any 
risk of political persecution or repression for talking to me, now or in the future? Are 
you willing and interested in talking to me about the topics mentioned above? You 
can choose freely the place and time for interviews, and which questions of the 
interview you want to respond to. 
 
 
Benefits: There may be no direct benefits to you from this project.  
 
 
Alternatives: You can choose not to participate in this project. 
 
 
Confidentiality: I will only take notes by hand, and these will be safely stored and 
protected, and later destroyed. Electronic data which I compile will be safely kept 
and protected by password, and they will not be stored in English, Arabic or French. 
Electronic data will also be destroyed within a year. Your name will be kept 
anonymous in this study unless you ask me to use your real name. 
 
 
Participant's Rights: It is totally voluntary to participate in this study. If you refuse, 
or if you at any time decide to interrupt your participation, you will not suffer any 
loss or penalty. 
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Contact Person: Any questions you may have about this project can be sent any 
time to: 
 
 
Johan Rognlie Roko, graduate student, American University in Cairo, AUC Ave., 
P.O. Box 74, New Cairo 11835 Egypt.  
E-mail: johanrro@aucegypt.edu                  
 
Cell phone:+20146868816 or +4747034371. 
 
 
 
Signature of the researcher 
 
 
 
Signature of participant 
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Annex III: Interview Guide 
 
• How was the legitimacy of the regime perceived over time (Over the last two 
decades?) 
◦ In what ways have people obtained information about corruption, other 
problems. (especially with mainstream media censored). 
• To what extent were ideas explicitly rejecting the Ben Ali Regime circulated 
before 17 December 2010? By which means? 
• In what ways were people apathetic/cynical/disillusioned by the previous 
socio-economic and political conditions? How did the regime spread fear in 
the population? 
• What discourses were shared over the last couple of years which promoted 
activism and mobilization? (From passive to active is key here) 
• In your opinion, what did people think about the legitimacy of riots erupting 
over the last decade? Eventually which groups sympathized, but remained 
passive? In what ways was 2010-2011 different? 
• In what ways were pre-existing social networks (eg families, the workplace, 
schools) and shared identities conducive to promoting opposition, and 
ultimately, activism? 
• In what ways were pre-existing associations, organizations, and civil society 
in general active in promoting and spreading the protests when it began?  
• What role did cyber-networks and new social media (eg Facebook) actually 
play for mobilization? Which role did your group play in particular?  
